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I. INTRODUCTION
Positive regulation of the healthcare industry is quite rare; most safety (e.g.,
FDA) or healthcare financing (e.g., fraud and abuse) regulations being introduced
are to correct abusive aspects of an otherwise functioning market. One of the
few exceptions was HIPAA's "Administrative Simplification,"' mandating
transactional standards for healthcare electronic exchanges. The HIPAA
adventure has been as expensive as its returns have been disappointing.2 Yet the
Bush Administration's current healthcare information technology ("HIT") patient
safety initiative is closely related technologically to HIPAA, albeit considerably
more complex. While committed to solving the nation's medical error, quality,
and cost problems, the Bush Administration is philosophically opposed to
introducing any "son of HIPAA" regulation and certainly not disposed to
financing the entire patient safety information endeavor.
In his 2005 State of the Union Address, President Bush urged Congress "to
move forward on a comprehensive health care agenda with . . . improved
information technology to prevent medical errors and needless costs ... and
medical liabilities reform that will reduce health care costs, and make sure
patients have the doctors and care they need. ' 3 Behind those few words lies a
health quality system in crisis. Traditional health quality regulatory schemes
(including medical malpractice) have reached the limits of their perceived
effectiveness. Yet, solving cost and quality issues with healthcare information
technologies remains as controversial as it is expensive.
It is now six years since the initial Institute of Medicine ("IOM") report on
medical error4 and the development of healthcare transaction standards pursuant
to HIPAA's mandate to introduce transactional standards for healthcare
1. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Pub. L. No. 104-
191, § 261, 110 Stat. 1936, 2021 (1996).
2. See, e.g., D'Arcy Guerin Gue with Randa Upham, The HIPAA Pirscriptionfor Healthcare-
Vhj Isn't It Working?, HEALTH MGMT. TECH., Sept. 2004, at 34.
3. President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address 2005 (Feb. 2, 2005), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/20050202-1l.html. The President's 2004
State of the Union address had contained remarkably similar language: "By computerizing health
records, we can avoid dangerous medical mistakes, reduce costs, and improve care. To protect the
doctor-patient relationship, and keep good doctors doing good work, we must eliminate wasteful
and frivolous medical lawsuits." President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address 2004 (Jan.
20,2004), availabk athttp://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040120-7.html. In
contrast, the President's 2003 address mentioned tort law reform but not medical error. President
George W. Bush, State of the Union Address 2003 (Jan 28, 2003), availabk at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-19.html.
4. IOM, To ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM (Linda T. Kohn et al.
eds., 1999) [hereinafter To ERR Is HUMAN].
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electronic exchanges.' The first of these watershed events appeared to confirm
that highlighting mistakes by individuals was counter-productive6 and to herald
a consensus around system or process reform.' The second promised a
dramatically more efficient era of healthcare administrative simplification designed
to reducti transaction costs and improve quality.
Traditional quality archetypes that process errors are inefficient and frequently
ineffective. State medical boards are compromised by their limited resources and,
more crucially, by their composition and practice.' As a quality improvement
tool, medical malpractice law has been fatally compromised by insurance "crisis"
cycles and the persistent battle for tort reform9 such that William Sage describes
an almost total politicization of the medical error and malpractice issues."0 The
tort reform movement and the rhetoric of frivolous lawsuits, defensive medicine,
and the tenuous connection between malpractice awards and rising healthcare
costs may have chilled suburban juries, but marginally effective tort reforms, such
as increasingly narrowed periods of limitation and hard damage caps, adversely
affect meritorious claims and, particularly in the case of damage caps,
5. Initial transaction standards were developed from 1998-2000. See, e.g., Press Release,
Department of Health & Human Services (HHS), HHS Proposes Administrative Simplification
Standards for Health Care Transactions (1998), http://aspe.hhs.gov/admnsimp/nprm/pressl.htm;
Press Release, HHS, HHS Announces Electronic Standards to Simplify Health Care Transactions
(2000), http://aspe.hhs.gov/admnsimp/final/pressl.htm.
6. Lucian L Leape, Foreword" Preventing MedicalAcddents: Is "Systems Ana sis" the Answer?, 27
AM.J.L. & MED. 145, 145-46 (2001).
7. See generaly Lucian L. Leape, Error in Medine, 272 JAMA 1851 (1994); James Reason,
Human Error Models and Management, 320 BMJ 768, 768-70 (2000).
8. Today, medical licensure reveals more about qualifications than quality. See Nicolas P.
Terry, Prescriptions ans Frontires (or How I Stopped Worrying about Viagra on the Web but Grew Concerned
about the Future ofHealtcare Devery), 4 YALEJ. HEALTH POL'Y, L. & ETHICS 183, 192 (2004). While
willing to intervene in fraud, patient abuse, and provider impairment cases, state boards are too
committed to "bad apple" and other outlier medical error explanations to deal with contemporary
quality problems.
9. The malpractice system operates satisfactorily in average cases and likely had some
positive deterrent effects in the 1970s and 1980s. However, outside of the mean, it exhibits too
many false negatives (medical errors that do not receive compensation) and false positives (non-
negligently caused adverse events that trigger compensation primarily because of catastrophic
injuries). As a system it displays too many indeterminacies because it is state-based and because
its outcomes are oversensitive to regional and local phenomena (e.g., elected judges, rural and urban
vs. suburban juries).
10. William M. Sage, Undertandng the First Mapractice Crisisoftbe2lstCentgy, in HEALTH LAW
HANDBOOK (Alice G. Gosfield ed., 2003).
Despite the health care system's acute need-indeed because of it-broad coalitions
across the political spectrum are tempted to co-opt medicine to advance larger agendas
about the effect of lawsuits on social stability and economic prosperity... [N]o matter
which camp claims victory in the overall battle, the outcome will not remedy serious
deficiencies in how American law deals with medical errors.
2005]
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disproportionately disadvantage the most seriously harmed victims of error. Of
course, tort "reform" does not deal with the medical error crisis; it merely
increases the likelihood that the costs of error will be externalized to injured
patients. Today, there are signs of backsliding from system reform to the culture
of blame with Lucian L. Leape and Donald M. Berwick arguing that ,the latest
malpractice crisis "has deflected interest of lawmakers from error prevention" to
malpractice reform."
The safety-related leveraging of process-supporting information technologies
started modestly. Following the publication of To Err is Human2 the Senate
Committee on Appropriations directed the Agency for Healthcare Research and
Quality ("AHRQ") to take the lead in improving patient safety. 3 In its
subsequent Crossing the Chasm report, the IOM argued, "IT [Information
Technology] has enormous potential to improve the quality of health care."' 4
Today, institutional reformers inside and outside the federal government
concentrate on little else. Contemporary health quality reform pays only lip
service to patients and doctors. All the energies are focused on institutional
reform; process reform by institutions for institutions. Federal agencies" and
NGO's 6 are driving quality, error-reduction, and cost-savings.
This emphasis on IT does not sit well with some commentators. Bemoaning
the way in which AHRQ is now concentrating its patient safety research dollars
11. Lucian L. Leape & Donald M. Berwick, Five Years After To Err Is Hman: What Have We
Learned?, 293 JAMA 2384, 2384 (2005).
12. IOM, sapra note 4.
13. See general# AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE RESEARCH AND QUALITY (AHRQ), AHRQ'S
PATIENT SAFETY INITIATIVE: BUILDING FOUNDATIONS, REDUCING RISK, INTERIM REPORT TO
THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, http://www.ahrq.gov/qual/pscongrpt/ (last
visited Oct. 31, 2005).
14. See, e.g., IOM, CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM: A NEW HEALTH SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY 164, 164 (2001) [hereinafter CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM].
15. HHS, http://www.hhs.gov/ (last visited Nov. 6,2005); Centers for Medicare & Medicaid
Services ("CMS'), http://www.cms.hhs.gov (last visited Nov. 6,2005); Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention ("CDC"), Public Health Information Network ("PHIN"),
http://www.cdc.gov/phin/index.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2005); U.S. Health Resources and
Services Administration ("HRSA"), http://www.hrsa.gov/ (last visited Nov. 6,2005); U.S. Food
and Drug Administration ("FDA"), http://www.fda.gov/ (last visited Nov. 6,2005); Agency for
Healthcare Research and Quality ("AHRQ"), http://www.ahrq.gov/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2005);
and Veterans Health Administration ("VHA"), Health Benefits & Services,
http://wwwl.va.gov/healthbenefits/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2005).
16. For example, Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations
("JCAHO"), http://www.jcaho.org/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2005); the National Quality Forum
("NQF"), http://www.qualityforum.org/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2005); the National Patient Safety
Foundation ("NPSF"), http://www.npsf.org/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2005); the Institute for
Healthcare Improvement ("IHI"), http://www.ihi.org/ihi (last visited Nov. 6,2005); the Leapfrog
Group, http://www.leapfroggroup.org/home (last visited Nov. 6,2005); and Markle Foundation,
http://www.connectingforhealth.org/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2005).
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on HIT projects, 7 Leape and Berwick have noted, notwithstanding the value they
place on HIT, "this reallocation revealed a serious misunderstanding of the broad
array of research that will be needed to address the safety problem, and is quickly
starving the new recruits who would have pursued aspects of safety other than
information technology."' 8 Equally, Wears and Berg remind us:
The misleading theory about Lecmology is that technic- problems
require technical solutions; i.e., a narrowly technical view of the
important issues involved that leads to a focus on optimizing the
technology. In contrast, a more useful approach views the clinical
workplace as a complex system in which technologies, people, and
organizational routines dynamically interact.'9
Yet, the steadfast focus on institutional quality by health quality reformers is
understandable. After all, in Crossing the Chasm, the IOM warned, "The current
care systems cannot do the job. Trying harder will not work. Changing systems
of care will."' Leape and Berwick are forced to acknowledge that prevailing
medical culture remains "a daunting barrier to creating the habits and beliefs of
common purpose, teamwork, and individual accountability for successful
interdependence that a safe culture requires."'" Indeed, from survey data, Audet
et al. conclude that while healthcare institutions have embraced quality
improvement activities, the same cannot be said for individual physicians.
22
It is less than surprising that safety architects have turned to solutions they
believe can be implemented on an abbreviated timeline, concentrated their
energies at the institutional level, and subscribed to the gospel of HIT.
Politicians, from the President down, have jumped on the health IT bandwagon,
with one Congressman on record saying of HIT, "[t]his is as big of an issue of
saving lives as the creation of antibiotics." 23 More importantly, the reform of
patient safety information appears to be one of the few healthcare initiatives
where a critically divided Congress can coalesce. The sharing of a stage by
17. Cf AHRQ, AHRQ Partnerships in Implementing Patient Safety,
http://www.ahrq.gov/qual/pips.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2005) (detailing recent AHRQ-funded
projects). See general# AHRQ, AHRQ Opens Coffers for I.T. Adoption, in HEALTH DATA
MANAGEMENT, Oct. 13, 2004, availabk at http://www.healthdatamanagement.com/html/news
/NewsStory.cfm?DID=12043 (reporting that AHRQ has awarded $139.5 million in HIT grants
and contracts).
18. Leape & Berwick, supra note 11, at 2385.
19. Robert L. Wears & Marc Berg, Computer Technolo g and Cinical Work, Still Waitingfor Godot,
293JAMA 1261, 1262 (2005).
20. CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM, supra note 14, at 4.
21. Leape & Berwick, supra note 11, at 2387.
22. Anne-Marie J. Audet et al., Measue, Learn, And Improve: Phyddans' Involvement In Quak
Improvement, 24 HEALTH AFF. 843 (2005).
23. Neil Versel, Reps. Kennedy and Muophy Admonish Health - ITIndusty, HEALTH - IT WORLD
NEWS, June 9, 2005, available at http://www.health-itworld.com/enews/news/06 09_606.html
(last visited Dec. 26, 2005).
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Senators Hillary Clinton and Bill Frist to promote their Health Technology to Enhance
.Quality Act of200524 did not just send a message of bipartisanship-it was also a
tacit acknowledgment that it is the only healthcare reform that is going anywhere
in the next few years.
Against this background, the purpose of this article is to examine thetechnical
and legal models for what will be referred to as process-supportitig health
technologies;' technologies that support the ongoing "process" or "system"
reform movement by collecting, coding, and distributing patient safety
information. This article first describes the intersecting patient safety information
technologies. Second, and with particular emphasis on records technology, it
examines some of the possible models for patient information distribution and
describes the data model issues faced by the architects of an Electronic Health
Record ("EHR"). Third, there is a critical survey of the legal issues surrounding
patient safety IT systems, particularly their error and privacy costs. Fourth there
is an examination of barriers to successful implementation of patient safety
systems and proposed solutions. Finally, the article questions whether U.S.
policymakers, regulators, and patient safety system architects should shift their
focus from purely technical and financial issues to take a more patient-centric
approach to the system they propose.
II. PATIENT SAFETY INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES
A. Introduction
IT-led system reform rotates around several intersecting technologies that are
at different stages of maturation. These technologies are quite different from
those that turned the U.S. healthcare system into the poster child of "high-tech"
medicine26 . This reputation based itself on investments in complex and costly
technologies, such as imaging, that created identifiable revenue streams and, most
importantly, were reimbursable. In other sectors of the economy, companies
have invested heavily in information technologies and e-commerce applications
24. Health Technology to Enhance Quality Act of 2005, S. 1262, 109th Cong. (2005).
25. See, e.g., Wears & Berg, supra note 19.
26. A point not lost on President Bush. See Press Release, White House, President Discusses
Health Care Information Technology Benefits (2005), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2005/01/20050127-7.html.
Now, look, most industries in America have used information technology to
make their businesses more cost-effective, more efficient and more
productive, and the truth of the matter is, health care hadn't. I mean, health
care has been fantastic in terms of technological change. I mean, you see these
machines in these hospitals-compared to what life was like ten years ago,
things have changed dramatically.
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that tend to increase access, improve service, and reduce costs for consumers.
However, the healthcare industry invests an average of $3,000 per worker per year
in IT compared to, for example, $15,000 invested by the financial services
sector.27
The IT "quality" (or process-supporting) solutions currently being offered to
the healthcare industry, or are in development, can be grouped into three broad
categories: (1) track-and-trace technologies, such as Radio Frequency
Identification ("RFID"), that positively identify drugs, dosages, equipment, and
patients; (2) "order entry" appliances or "decision-support" systems ("CDSS' )
designed to avoid medication errors stemming from, for example, prescription
illegibility; and (3) electronic records systems (what are described below as
Electronic Medical Records and EHR models).
B. Track-and-Trace
"Tracking" and "tracing" technologies identify drugs, dosages, equipment,
biologics, patients (and their "right-site" body parts), and clinicians. Improving
techniques for positively identifying patients is a broadly held goal of patient
safety organizations.28 The two principal technologies are bar codes and Radio
Frequency Identification (RFID) tags. They become important "inputs" for the
patient safety information domain as increasingly they are used not only to locate
that to which they are attached, but also report on interactions between two or
more located objects or persons.
Barcodes are so familiar because of their extensive implementation in retail
environments. They identify the product they are attached to with a combination
of monochromatic wide and narrow bars and spaces. 9 Scanners illuminate the
bar code and read it from the light reflected back from the white areas.30 The
simplest model, and the one with which we are all familiar, is the "linear bar
code" such as the Universal Product Code ("UPC") used in supermarkets.31
In the healthcare industry these codes are extensively implemented to code
larger items and boxes of smaller ones. However, linear codes are quite large and
are therefore ill suited to marking small objects such as, for example, individual
medication doses. 32 Two-dimensional bar codes33 can store more characters in
27. Steve Lohr, Health Industy Under Pressure to Computerize, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 19, 2005, at
C1O.
28. See, e.g.,JCAHO, 2006CRITICALACCESS HOSPITALANDHOSPITALNATIONALPATIENT
SAFETY GOALS (2005), http://www.jcaho.org/accredited+organizations/patient+safety
/06_npsg/06_npsg_cahhap.htm.




32. Baxter Int'l Inc., supra note 29.
33. SeegenerallyBar Code 1, http://www.adamsl.com/pub/russadam/stack.htm1 (last visited
2005]
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a given space and do not require the scanner to be in a direct line-of-sight.4 They
are, nevertheless, still too large for individual drug doses. As a result, the bar code
industry has developed reduced space symbology ("RSS") codes"5 that, when
combined with high-resolution printing techniques,3 can be applied to very small
objects. It is this technology that is at the heart of the FDA's 2004 rtemaking
that requires, inter aia,3  barcoding for all unit dose drugs and biologics.
Currently, hospital groups are urging the FDA to extend the rule to medical
devices,38 while the Joint Commission for Accreditation of Healthcare
Organizations (CAHO) has recently articulated a safety goal to "label all
medications, medication containers (e.g., syringes, medicine cups, basins), or other
solutions on and off the sterile field in perioperative and other procedural
settings. 39
Notwithstanding the advances in bar code technologies and its very low per
unit cost, there are inherent limitations in the technology. As a result, it is likely
that much of the "tracking" and "identifying" market will shift to RFID. An
RFID system consists of a reader and a tag. Typically, the RFID reader emits a
radio signal, activating the transponder in the tag that is printed on, attached to,
or implanted in an object or person. Once activated, the tag transponder sends
data back to the reader.' RFID is more likely to be used to identify something
specifically rather than generically.4 For example, the UPC code contained in a
bar code on a bottle of aspirin is the same for'all aspirin bottles of that size made
by that manufacturer. In contrast, an RFID tag placed on a particular Rx drug
bottle will differentiate that specific bottle from all others.
RFID technology has several obvious advantages over bar codes: it does not
require line-of-sight scanning; the code does not have to be surface-mounted; and
the core technology is scaleable (and so is more likely to accommodate escalating
Oct. 31, 2005).
34. Elena Malykhina, Bar Codes Expeaed To Have A Long Life, INFO. WK., Oct. 21, 2004,
availabk at http://www.informationweek.com/story/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=51000135.
35. See GS1, THE GLOBAL LANGUAGE OF BUSINESS: RSS AND COMPOSITE SYMBOLOGY A
NEW DEVELOPMENT IN BARCODING, http://www.gsl.org/index.php?http://www.ean-
int.org/rss.intro.htnl&2 (last visited Oct. 31, 2005).
36. Baxter Int'l Inc., supra note 29.
37. See general# Bar Code Label Requirement for Human Drug Products and Biological
Products, 69 Fed. Reg. 9120 (Feb. 26, 2004).
38. Letter from American Hospital Association and others to Lester Crawford, Acting
Commissioner of Food and Drug Administration (2005), available at http://www.aha.org/aha/
advocacy-grassroots/advocacy/agencyletters/ content/050509barcode.pdf.
39. JCAHO, spra note 28, at Goal 3D.
40. Jim Harper, RFID Tags and Privay: How Bar-Codes-On-Steroids Are Real# a 98-Lb. Wleaking
89 CEI ON POINT 2,June 21, 2004, http://www.cei.org/pdf/4080.pdf [hereinafter RFID Tags and
Privacy].
41. Id. at 4.
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data demands). Further, unlike read-only bar codes, RFID chips are read-write,42
and RFID has the potential to better integrate with implantable technologies
43
such as wireless patient monitoring devices."
There are two broad types of RFID technologies: active and passive. Passive
RFID tags are very small and quite inexpensive, s with unit costs expected to fall
to five cints by 2006. Passive tags do not have their own power supply but
derive sufficient power to respond from the magnetic fields emitted by the
scanners that monitor them.' Typically, passive tags operate up to a distance of
a few feet.' In contrast, active tags are larger and have their own power supplies.
They are capable of emitting signals throughout a hospital floor or even an entire
institution, allowing tracking of bags of contaminated waste, larger pieces of
hardware, medical staff, or patients.49 The performance of RFID systems is also
a function of the radio frequency on which they operate: low frequency systems
use less power, are less expensive, and penetrate objects and fluids, but have a
short range; high frequency systems lack the advantages of low frequency ones
but have a dramatically higher range.'
The core value proposition of RFID, and the one that explains its traction in
the healthcare industry, is its positive impact on "supply chain efficiency,"
including inventory control and improved protection against drug diversion and
counterfeit products."* RFID will be an increasingly important source of patient
safety information and error reduction. For example, an adhesive tag placed near
the correct site of impending surgery can be encoded on-site with the type of
procedure and the surgeon's name. 2 Similarly, an RFID enabled medical implant
42. See, e.g.,James Reiner & Mike Sullivan, RFID in Healtbcare: A Panaceafor the Regulations and
Issues Affectiving the Industry? (2005),
http://www.ups-scs.com/solutions/white-papers/wpRFID inhealthcare.pdf.
43. Mark Hagland, Bar Coding and RFID, in HEALTHCARE INFORMATIcS, NINE TECH
TRENDS 36 (2005), http://www.healthcare-informatics.com/issues/2005/02-05/cover.htm#bar.
44. See, e.g., Surgichip, http://www.surgichip.com/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2005); Seegeneral
Rob Stein, Implantabk MedicalID Approved By FDA, WASH. POST, Oct.14, 2004, at A01.
45. Hagland, supra note 43.
46. See Reiner & Sullivan, supra note 42, at 1.
47. Id. at 3.
48. Hagland, supra note 43.
49. See id.
50. Harper, spra note 40, at 3.
51. See general# Gardiner Harris, Tiny Antennas to Keep Tabs on U.S. Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
15, 2004, at Al.
52. See Rob Curtis, New ID Tag Could Prevent Suecal Errors, USA TODAY, Nov. 20, 2004,
available at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/techinnovations/2004-11-20-surgichip-x.htm.
Additionally, a digital photograph of the patient and the tagging information can be integrated in




could have patient and procedure data added subsequently: 3 a test tube filled with
a specimen could be written to with the patient's identification or the routing for
the specimen, and RFID-equipped surgical instruments -can be certified as
properly cleaned after visiting an RFID-tagged sterilization chamber.' Once
patients, drugs, and equipment are tagged, necessary equipment closest to a
patient can be identified and alerts can be automated if, for example, a particular
drug enters the room of a patient who is allergic to it"s or a cadaver goes
missing._
6
In the short-term, RFID and bar code technologies likely will co-exist,s7 but as
RFID costs decrease and technical issues (such as the possible interference of RF
signals with devices like pacemakers) are solved, RFID will become the dominant
tracking technology'M and a significant source of patient safety data.
C Order Enty and Decision Support
"Order Entry" and "Decision Support" technologies primarily target
preventable adverse drug events; "errors in the processes of ordering,
transcribing, dispensing, administering, or monitoring medications." 9  Entry
technologies consist of computerized physician order entry ("CPOE") systems
that seek to avoid medication errors caused by illegibility and other recording
mistakes.' CPOEs typically are cart-mounted, tablet, or handheld PCs that avoid
handwriting and transcribing errors by, for example, forcing prescribers into using
pre-defined fields (such as dosage) and other standardized formats that clarify
their intent.6 Much of the impetus for CPOE adoption has come from The
53. See e.g., Press Release, Zarlink Introduces World's First Wireless Chip Designed
Specifically for In-Body Communications Systems (2005),
http://news.zarlinkcom/archive/2005/May/31 /May3l-ZL701 00-English.htm.en.
54. See Reiner & Sullivan, supra note 42.
55. Chris Berdik, Technology Now Used on Toll Road and in Stores is Moving into Hospitals,
BOSTON GLOBE, Feb 1, 2005, availabk at
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/health science/ardces/2005/02/01 /technologynow-u
sed_on_tol_roads andinstoresismoving_into.hospitals/.
56. Charles Ornstein & Rebecca Trounson, Answer to Scandak Barcodes in Cadavers, L. A.
TIMES, Jan. 20, 2005, at Al.
57. Malykhina, supra note 34.
58. See general# Hagland, supra note 43.
59. Rainu Kaushal & David W. Bates, Computeried Psiidan Order Entry (CPOE) with Clinical
Decsion Support Systems (CDSSs), in AHRQ, MAKING HEALTH CARE SAFER, A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
OF PATIENT SAFETY PRACTICES 61 (Kaveh G. Shojania et al. eds, 2001), availabk at
http://www.ahrq.gov/cinic/ptsafety/pdf/ptsafety.pdf.
60. See general4 PETER KILBRIDGE WITH ASSISTANCE FROM KATY GLADYSHEVA, E-
PRESCRIBING (2001), http://www.chcf.org/documents/hospitals/EPrescribing.pdf.
61. See, e.g., Medical Communications Systems,
http://www.medcomsys.com/MCS/product/pmcpoeoverview.asp (last visited Oct. 31, 2005).
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Leapfrog Group, which has provided extensive guidelines for their adoption and
use6 2 (and inadvertently, therefore, suggested a new standard of care to
malpractice lawyers), and from AHRQ, which has conducted research and
provided funding.63
A clinical decision support system ("CDSS") is software (frequently running
on or interfacing with proprietary hardware) "designed to be a direct aid to
clinical decision-making, in which the characteristics of an individual patient are
matched to a computerized clinical knowledge base and patient-specific
assessments or recommendations are then presented to the clinician or the patient
for a decision."" A CDSS supplements entry systems by, for example, checking
for drug interactions and suggesting corollary orders.6" When combined with
additional technologies, such as "smart" drug carts,66 these systems reduce
dispensing, administering, or monitoring errors. Preliminary research suggests a
decline in primary care prescription costs,67 as well as length of stay and antibiotic
costs in intensive care units.'n
A CDSS references drug interaction information, EHR data, and potential
treatment models (such as outcomes data, clinical practice guidelines, and
eventually evidence-based research).69 CDSS technologies sometimes are referred
to as "surveillance" systems. While an accurate description, this seems less
popular in the literature, no doubt in part because of its "big brother"
connotations.
There are, of course, operational differences between the various commercial
and "home-brewed" CDSS implementations; primarily differences in whether the
systems "push" data (for example, alerts or clinical management plans) to the
physician without being asked, or whether they only respond to requests for
62. Press Release, Leapfrog GroupNew Guide For Hospitals On Computerized Physician
Order Entry (CPOE) Gives Hospitals Much Needed Resource (2001),
http://www.leapfroggroup.org/media/f le/Leapfrog-FCG-Press-Release-12-06-02.pdf. See aLo
JANE METZGER & FRAN TURISCo, LEAPFROG GROUP, CoMPuTERIzED PHYSICIAN ORDER
ENTRY: A LOOK AT THE VENDOR MARKETPLACE AND GETTING STARTED (2001),
http://www.leapfroggroup.org/media/file/Leapfrog-CPOGuide.pdf.
63. Kaushal & Bates, supra note 59.
64. Ida Sim et al., CUnical Decision Support Systems for the Practice of Evidence-based Medidne, 8 J.
AM. MED. INFORMATICS Ass'N 527, 528 (2001).
65. Kaushal & Bates, supra note 59, at 59.
66. See, e.g., MDG MEDICAL, REDUCING HuMAN ERROR AND ENSURING PATIENT SAFETY
(2005), http://www.mdgmedical.com/ServerRx.html.
67. See, e.g., S. Troy McMullin et al., Impact of an Eddence-Based Conmputeried Decision Suppor
System on Primay Care Prescript'on Costs, 2 ANNALS FAM. MED. 494-498 (2004).
68. See, e.g., Vitali Sintchenko et al., Handheld Computer-based Dedsion Support Reduces Patient
Length of Stay andAntibiotic Prescribing in Citical Care, 12 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS ASS'N. 398, 401
(2005).
69. Seegeneral# Ida Sim et al., supra note 64.
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advice.7" Much of the controversy over CDSS systems is rooted in the content
of the knowledge base that prompts the recommendation provided to the
physician. Standard drug and dosage information or even information derived
from studies of patient outcomes should not be too controversial. However, the
future of CDSS lies in the integration of clinical practice guidelines ("CPGs') and
evidence-based medicine.7' Yet, both CPGs and "evidence-basedrpractice"
remain controversial among many physicians.
There are increasingly positive trends showing CPOE and CDSS adoption in
hospitals; trends not replicated in physician offices. A 2005 survey by Forester
Research and the American Medical Association (AMA) found that only a small
percentage of physicians with handheld devices use them for clinical purposes,
though a far larger number use them for administrative purposes. Sixty percent
of physicians in practices that have implemented electronic prescribing use their
handhelds to write prescriptions and even more use the devices to check
medication information.72
When originally introduced, CPOEs were relatively passive devices. Today, it
is still possible to have CPOE technologies without a CDSS "back-end,' 73 or vice
versa.74 In practice, however, the two technologies are merging in large part
because research has suggested that combined CPOE-CDSS systems offer
considerable advantages over freestanding CPOE systems.75 In the medium term,
the CPOE or "front-end" will likely merge with Electronic Medical Records
(EMR) entry technologies and the back-end CDSS will merge with the healthcare
institution's EMR, just as such institutions will merge their EMR and imaging
storage and retrieval systems.76 Particularly once merged, the CPOE/EMR will
be the dominant input for patient safety information and, as already noted, the
CDSS increasingly will be the recipient of safety data generated by EHR systems.
70. See general Charles P. Friedman et al., Do Physidans Know When Their DiagnosesAre Coret?
Implications for Decision Support and Errr Reduction, 20 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 334-39 (2005).
71. Seegeneral# Ida Sim et al., supra note 64.
72. Caroline Broder, Survy: PDAs, Handhelds Under-Utiied for Cknical App#cations,
HEALTHCARE IT NEWS, Mar. 23, 2005, available at
http://www.healthcareitnews.com/NewsArticleView.aspx?ContentID=2676.
73. See Wikipedia, Front-end Back-end, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Back-end (last visited
Oct. 31, 2005).
74. Kaushal & Bates, supra note 59, at 59.
75. See, e.g., Anne Bobb et al., The Epidemiology of Prestribing Errors: The Potential Impac of
ConmputerizedPresciberOrderEntry, 164 ARCH. INTERNAL MED. 785 (2004); Bernard Fernando et al.,
Prescribing Safeoy Features of General Practice Camputer Systems: Evaluation Using Simulated Test Cases, 328
BMJ 1171 (2004).
76. See, e.g., Kaiser Tries to Wed One App to Many, HEALTH DATA MGMT., June 3, 2005,
http://healthdatamanagement.com/html/news/NewsStory.cftn?DID=l 2751.
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D. Electronic Medical Records
The electronic medical (or patient) record (EMR) is hardly a new technology.
Some form of electronic system is increasingly common in hospitals and doctor's
offices, even if it started life as an office management, billing, or scheduling tool.
Less common is a true comprehensive EMR that replaces paper within
institutions. Even mature healthcare systems (in Australia, Europe, and the
United States) have made only limited progress towards delivering functioning
EMR systems." Senator Hillary Clinton described the state of medical records
keeping in the United States as "in the Dark Ages,"78 and, unfortunately, it is still
hard to disagree with the IOM's 2003 opinion:
In most of the nation's hospitals, orders for medications, laboratory tests,
and other services are still written on paper, and many hospitals lack even -
the capability to deliver laboratory and other results in an automated
fashion. The situation is no different in most small practice settings,
where there has been little if any migration to electronic records.79
Even a modest hospital or physician office EMR system dramatically increases
the amount of patient safety information collected, with all the attendant
confidentiality and security risks. It is the "record of the periodic care provided
mainly by one institution."' ° Some of the largest private providers have increased
the pace of EMR adoption. For example, Kaiser Permanente, the largest non-
profit HMO in the United States, with more than eight million members in nine
States and 12,000 doctors, has recently adopted a three-year, United States $1.8
billion EHR/EMR program8t known as KP HealthConnect. 82 In the public
77. Nicolas P. Terry, Ekctronic Health Records: Internationa Structura4 and Legal Perspectives, 12
J.L. & MED. 26, 30-36 (2004).
78. Devlin Barrett, Clinton, Frist Tout MedicalRecords Bill, NEWS& OBSERVER, June 16,2005,
available at http://newsobserver.com/24hour/pofics/story/2485565p-10829257c.html.
79. IOM, KEY CAPABIITIES OF AN ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORD SYSTEM 3 (2003).
[hereinafter KEY CAPABILITIES OF AN ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORD SYSTEM].
80. ROYAL COLLEGE OF GENERAL PRACTITIONERS, HEALTH INFORMATICS TASK FORCE,
ELECTRONIC PATIENT RECORD STUDY, SCOPE EPR (1998), http://www.schin.ncl.ac.uk/rcgp/
scopeEPR/report/i-a-22.htm.
81. Rhonda L Rundle, Big HMO Plans to Put MedicalRecords Onlne, WALL ST.J., Feb. 4,2003,
at D4.
82. Debora Vrana, Kaiser's PrsptionforMedidne is DigitalHoping to Cut Costs and Improve Care,
the HMO is Coputening All of its Patient Records, L.A. TIMES, May 30, 2005, at Cl; See also Scott
Shepard, Baptist puts $50M in Paperess System, MEMPHIS BUS. J., July 8, 2005, available at
http://www.bizjournals.com/memphis/stories/2005/07/11/ story l.html?GP=OTC-
MJ1752087487; Nancy Ferris, Tennessee backs BlueCross Records Prject, HEALTH IT, July 12, 2005,
availabk at http://www.govhealthit.com/article89471-07-06-05-Web (describing "Community




sector, the Department of Veterans Affairs ("VA") has established itself as the
poster child for publicly funded and proided healthcare committed to process
reform and technologically mediated delivery of services.8 3 It has made
considerable progress with its system-wide Vista EMR system."M Notwithstanding
such efforts, EMRs are in place at only eighteen percent of hospitals, twenty-five
to thirty percent of group practices, and ten percent of physician offices."5
In smaller practices, these low adoption rates are a function of cost. In late
2004, the average cost for an integrated records system was $7,232 per physician
per year or $603 per month; considerably higher than the $100 per month target
urged on the industry by the federal government.'M The primary technical issue
with EMR technology is that more than 250 software vendors currently market
EMR products and none of those products allow for true data interoperability.8 7
It is this lack of interoperability that is at the root of the movement towards the
Electronic Health Record.
E. The Electronic Health Record
1. Introduction
An EHR, described as the "central nervous system" of the healthcare system,'M
seeks to link or otherwise leverage the patient safety information contained in
existing information silos such as hospital EMRs. In the words of Joan S. Ash
and David W. Bates, "[a]t its most sophisticated or most infused level, the EHR
becomes a hub of all activity, something that permeates every element of the
workflow and of work life."' Thus, broadly conceptualized, a comprehensive,
longitudinal EHR will: (1) "interconnect with and enhance other error-reducing
and cost-saving technologies such as decision support systems," (2) "streamline
health care dataflow using an interoperable and standardized nomenclature," (3)
"improve quality by encouraging accurate and legible communication among
83. See, e.g., NATIONAL CENTER FOR PATIENT SAFETY (NCPS), CREATING A CULTURE OF
SAFETY, http://www.patientsafety.gov/vision.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2005).
84. See infra text accompanying note 325.
85. Laura Landro, The Informed Patient: Five InnovationsAidthe Push To EkctronicMedicalRecords,
WALL ST.J., Feb. 9, 2005, at D5.
86. Surv : Records Prics Cross the Line, HEALTH DATA MGMr. (2005), available at
http://www.healthdatamanagement.com/html/news/NewsStory.cfm?DID=12475.
87. David C. Kibbe et al., The Continuiy of Care Record, 70 AM. FAM. PHYSIcIAN 1220, 1222
(2004) (citing unpublished CHIT data).
88. Paul M. Ellwood, Shattuck Lecture: Outcomes Management: A Technology of Paient Experience,
318 NEw. ENG.J. MED. 1549, 1550 (1988).
89. Joan S. Ash & David W. Bates, Factors and Forces Affecting EHR System Adoption: Report of
a 2004ACMI Discussion, 12J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS Ass'N 8,10(2005), availabkathttp://www.j-
aniia.org/cgi/content/full12/1/8 [hereinafter Factors and Fore:.
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providers," (4) "automate adverse event and medical error disclosure," and (5)
"facilitate reliable and reproducible outcomes research and reporting."
9
0
There are several forces, error and reduction aside, relating to healthcare
delivery driving the United States interest in a national EHR system.91 These
include the shift from in-patient to ambulatory care (and other episodic models)
that accelerated the need for accurate and efficient flow of patient medical and
billing information between organizationally and geographically distinct providers.
Second, the operational aspects of managed care (such as the needs of "gate
keeping" physicians who authorize referrals, demands by payers for performance
"report cards," and system administrators' increasing needs for sophisticated
utilization review and risk management tools) increased the need for data
transparency.92 Third, the growth of "shared care," whereby the patient shares
responsibility with the provider for care and is likely to have increasingly
fragmented or episodic relationships with multiple providers, requires that
patients must have access to health data generally and, more controversially,
information in their record. 93 Furthermore, "shared care" requires that providers
have transparent access to other occasions of treatment, particularly
pharmacotherapy. Finally, both patients and regulators are demanding increasing
amounts of data regarding errors and outcomes in populations;94 data that is
difficult to generate without sophisticated data coding and nearly impossible to
analyze without complex, comprehensive database systems.
Among United States policymakers and politicians, the adoption of a national,
interoperable EHR system has become the Holy Grail of patient safety. Absent
the ability of individual, siloed EMRs to transfer information between them, the
current shortfall in patient safety data, including missing clinical information
during patient visits,95 will continue. Without data interoperability, our healthcare
system lacks the most important source for broad scale outcomes research.
90. Tracy D. Gunter & Nicolas P. Terry, The Emegence of National Electronic Health Record
Architectures in the United States and Australia Models, Costs, and.Questions, 7 J. MED. INTERNET RES.
e3 (2005), http://www.jmir.org/2005/l/e3/#ref73.
91. Terry, supra note 77, at 28-29.
92. Paul C. Tang& W. Ed Hammond, A Progress Report on Computer-BasedPatient Records in the
United States, in IOM, THE COMPUTER-BASED PATIENT RECORD; AN ESSENTIAL TECHNOLOGY
FOR HEALTH CARE, REVISED EDITION (Richard S. Dick et al. eds., Nat'l Head. Press 1997).
http://books.nap.edu/html/computer/commentary.html. (last visited Oct. 31, 2005).
93. See, e.g., Christopher C. Tsai & Justin Starren, Patient Participation in Eketronic Medical
Records, 285 JAMA 1765, 1765 (2001); Jem Rashbass, The Patient-Owned, Population-Based Eketronic
Meical Record A Revolutionaty Resour for Clinical Mediane, 285 JAMA 1769 (2001).
94. See, e.g., Laura Landro, The informedpatient: Consumers Need Health-Care Data. WALL ST.J.,
Jan. 29, 2004, at D3.




2. Policy and Process: The Decade of Health Information Technology
Moving to a national EHR' is not a new goal, but until quite recently, progress
has been glacial.97 The HIPAA statute re-tasked the National Committee on Vital
and Health Statistics ("NCVHS"), a statutory body that advises the United States
Secretary of Health and Human Services ("HHS"),9" to become the primary
advisory group for health information policy, essentially overseeing the
development of the nation's health information systems.9 The NCVHS Interim
Report in June 2000 sketched a broad model for a National Health Information
Infrastructure ("NHII") as the:
set of technologies, standards, applications, systems, values, and laws that
support all facets of individual health, health care, and public health. The
broad goal of the NHII is to deliver information to individuals-
consumers, patients, and professionals-when and where they need it,
so they can use this information to make informed decisions about
health and health care.... The content of the NHII will be varied and
complex. It includes clinical, population, and personal data; practice
guidelines; biomedical, health services, and other research findings; and
consumer health information.... In effect, the content moves beyond
data to information and, ultimately, to knowledge based on analysis and
experience. t°
96. Parallel to federal and private sector initiatives, several states have announced statewide
patient information networks or EHR systems. These include Kentucky (SB 2, signed by
Governor, March 2005), NewJersey (N.J. to Create Ekctroni Medical Records System, PHILADELPHIA
Bus.J., May 11, 2005, availabk at http://philadelphia.bizjournals.com/philadelphia/stories/2005/
05/09/daily24.html), Wisconsin (Anita Weier, $10mfor Medical Records in Buget, CAPITAL TIMES,
Feb. 4,2005, at 3A) (reporting establishment of state Health Care Quality and Patient Safety Board
to develop statewide health IT system by 2010). However, given the current perilous condition of
state healthcare funding, questions remain as to how such projects will be funded. We are also
seeing preliminary results from regional or local demonstration programs many of which were
funded by "Connecting Communities for Better Health" under the Foundation for eHealth
Initiative, http://ccbh.ehealthinitiative.org/about/default.mspx (last visited Dec. 21, 2005), that
is itself partially funded by federal government grants. See generaly Stacy Lawrence,
Regional Elecronic Medical Record Efforts Get Grants, eWEEK, July 22, 2004,
http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1759,1626136,00.asp.
97. See generaly Eta S. Bemer et al., Will the Wave Finally Break? A Brief View of the Adoption of
Ekectronic Medical Records in the United States, 12 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS Ass'N 3, 3-4 (2005),
availabk at http://www.jamia.org/content/vol12/issue1/ [hereinafter Will the Wave Final Break I.
98. 42 U.S.C. S 242k(k) (2000).
99. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, § 263,
110 Stat. 1936, 2031 (1996).
100. NAT'L COMM. ON VITAL & HEALTH STATISTICS, TOWARD A NAT'L HEALTH INFO.
INFRASTRUCTURE INTERIM REPORT (2000), avhiabkat http://ncvhs.hhs.gov/NHII2kReport.htm.
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As discussed below'°' HIPAA's EDI transactional model was the first
interoperable data model to sit on this infrastructure. Although there is a general
interlocking of EHR developments, the most recent foundational initiatives came
from the non-governmental IOM'0 2 and NCVHS. It was the initial work of these
two bodies that identified the technical properties of the United States patient
safety data model and hinted at its architecture."0 '
Representing the private sector in the EHR movement has been the
"Connecting for Health"" initiative funded by the Markle Foundation.' One
of the key components of that initiative is a "Working Group on Policies for
Coordination across the EHR and the PHR",'° which is concentrating on data
standards0 7 with a view to "[a] ccelerating the rate of adoption of national clinical
data standards in order to facilitate true interoperability". °s Overlapping with this
initiative is the work of the EHR Collaborative,"° which consists of the major
professional stakeholders such as the AMA and the Healthcare Information and
Management Systems Society."'
Plans for a national EHR may still be somewhat aspirational, but the issue is
no longer on the back burner. On April 26, 2004, President Bush announced his
goal of assuring that most Americans have electronic health records within the
101. See infra text accompanying note 153.
102. The IOM is a member of the National Academies of Science, which received its charter
from the United States Congress as an independent advisory body. See http://www.iom.edu/
faq.asp?id=2959 (last visited Oct. 31, 2005).
103. NAT'L COMM. ON VITAL & HEALTH STATISTICS, REPORT TO THE SEC'Y OF THE U.S.
DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. ON UNIFORM DATA STANDARDS FOR PATIENT MEDICAL
RECORD INFO. (2000), http://wwwncvhs.hhs.gov/hipaa000706.pdf [hereinafter UNIFORM DATA
STANDARDS]; Letter from John Lumpkin, Chair, National Committee on Vital and Health Statistics
to Tommy G. Thompson, Secretary, U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Servs. (Nov. 5, 2003),
avadlabk athttp://www.ncvhs.hhs.gov/031 105??3.pdf [hereinafter Letter from John Lumpkin]; KEY
CAPABILITIES OF AN ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORD SYSTEM, supra note 79, at n.26 and App. E,
available at http://www.nap.edu/books/0309090776/html.
104. See Improving Health in the Information Age, http://www.connectingforhealth.org.
(last visited Oct. 31, 2005).
105. See Markle Foundation, http://www.markle.org/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2005).
106. See Working Group on Poiies for Coordination Acmss the EHR and the PHR, CONNECTING
FOR HEALTH, http://www.connectingforhealth.org/workinggroups/poLcoordinationwg.html
(last visited Oct. 31, 2005).
107. THE DATA STANDARDS WORKING GROUP, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2003),
http://www.connectingforhealth.org/resources/dswg._report_6.5.03.pdf.
108. Id. at 4.




next ten years."' To this end, the President appointed" 2 Dr. David Brailer to the
new post of National Health. Information Technology Coordinator to guide the
"nationwide implementation of interoperable health information technology.""' 3
This broad objective was announced by then HHS Secretary Thompson as the
"Decade of Health Information Technology" to be built around "a 10-year plan
to transform the delivery of health care by building a new health information
infrastructure, including electronic health records and a new network to link
health records nationwide.""' 4 The more granular goals and their attendant
strategies were described at that time as:
Goal 1 - "Inform Clinical Practice:" Bringing information tools to the
point of care, especially by investing in EHR systems in physician
offices and hospitals.
Goal 2 - "Interconnect Clinicians:" Building an interoperable health
information infrastructure, so that records follow the patient and
clinicians have access to critical health care information when
treatment decisions are being made.
Goal 3 - "Personalize Care:" Using health information technology to
give consumers more access and involvement in health decisions.
Goal 4 - "Improve Population Health:" Expanding capacity for public
health monitoring, quality of care measurement, and bringing
research advances more quickly into medical practice."'
Initially, funding for the Office of the National Coordinator for Health
Information Technology ("ONCHIT") and its demonstration projects failed to
find Congressional" 6 or even Administration approval." 7  In mid-2005 the
Congressional appropriations committee approved $75 million for ONCHIT
111. Transforming Health Care: The President's Health Information Technology Plan,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/technology/economic-policy2O0404/chap3.html (last visited
Oct. 31, 2005).
112. The appointment was by Presidential decree. Under the proposed Health Technology
to Enhance Quality Act of 2005, the National Coordinator position would be formally established
within HHS. Health Technology to Enhance Quality Act of 2005, S. 1262, 109th Cong. § 101
(2005).
113. Exec. Order No. 13335, 69 Fed. Reg. 24,059 (Apr. 27, 2004).
114. Press Release, HHS, Thompson Launches "Decade of Health Information Technology"
(July 21, 2004), http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2004pres/20040721a.htrl.
115. Id.
116. ITFinancing: Feds Hold Back Milons on Bilion Dollar Concept, HEALTH MGMT. TECH.,Jan.
2005, at 12.
117. Stacy Lawrence, Bush Brings Back Health Care IT: The President Proposes Spending an
Additonal 50 Milon in Support of Health Care IT in 2005, eWEEK, Jan. 29, 2005,
http://www.eweek.com/artide2/0,1895.1756871.00.asp.
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(plus $50 million for AHRQ)," s but its Senate counterpart cut the ONCHIT to
$45.2 million potentially jeopardizing EHR prototyping." 9
Much of the technical standards work is now centralized in the hands of the
Consolidated Health Informatics ("CHI") Initiative"2 that operates under the
supervision of ONCHIT. The CHI Initiative is restricted to creating standards
for the federal government (as part of the overall federal government IT initiative
and, specifically, the Federal Health Architecture), 2' but coordinates its activity
with the private sector through NCVHS. In June 2005 HHS set up the
"American Health Information Community" ("AHIC"), an advisory body "to
provide a forum for interests in and outside of the Federal government to
recommend specific actions that will accelerate the widespread application of
health IT."'" The goal is to open the process up to broader public scrutiny and
involve more stakeholders. AHIC is not designed to be a permanent government
body but is conceived of as a transitional step towards private sector HIT
governance.'
23
Keen to forge a public-private partnership on the issue, the Bush
Administration recently convened a "HIT Leadership Panel" drawn from
executives of large companies that purchase healthcare for their employees. This
Panel identified the following key imperatives:
1. Widespread adoption of interoperable HIT should be a top priority
for the U.S. health care system.
2. The federal government should use its leverage as the nation's largest
health care payer and provider to drive adoption of HIT.
3. Private sector purchasers and health care organizations can and
should collaborate alongside the federal government to drive
adoption of HIT. 4
118. House panel passes Labor-HHS Spending Bill, AHA NEWS (2005), availabk at
http://www.ahanews.com/ahanews/jsp/display.jsp?dcrpath=AHANEWS/AHANewsNowArt
icle/data/ann_050609_spending&domain=AHANEWS.
119. Bob Berwin, Senate slashes HHS Health IT Budget, Govr HEALTH IT, July 18, 2005,
availabk at http://www.govhealthit.com/article89584-07-15-05-Web.
120. U.S. Dept. Health & Human Servs., Office of the National Coordinator for Health
Information Technology (ONCHIT), http://www.hhs.gov/healthit/chiinitiative.html (last visited
Oct. 9, 2005).
121. U.S. Dept. Health & Human Servs., Federal Health Architecture, http://www.hhs.gov/
fedhealtharch/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2005).
122. HHS Fact Sheet, American Health Information Comniuniy (2005), http://www.hhs.gov/
healthit/documents/FactSheet-AHIC.pdf.
123. Id.




Since his appointment to ONCHIT, Dr. Brailer has launched an extensive and
often personal lobbying effort to persuade the health industry to work together
on patient safety information standards."2 In the meantime, ONCHIT has issued
requests for information ("RFIs") and requests for proposal ("RFPs") as it seeks
to meet its goal of a National Health Information Network ("NHIN").
In November 2004 ONCHIT issued an RFI seeking public comment on how
to achieve and sustain widespread interoperability of health information
technologies and health information exchange. 126 ONCHIT published a summary
of the information received in June 2005127 and followed up with RFPs to
address:
(1) Standards ("to identify, analyze, and resolve gaps and duplications within the
standards industry, and propose resolution strategies and timelines'), (2)
Certification ("to develop criteria that addresses EHR functionality and will include
ambulatory and inpatient features, decision support features, and performance
reporting."), (3) Prototypes for a NHIN Architecture ("to develop and evaluate
prototypes for an Internet-based NHIN architecture that would maximize the use
of existing resources such as the Internet to achieve widespread interoperability
among health care software applications, particularly EHRs'), and (4) Privacy and
Security Solutions for Health Information Exchange ("to assess and develop
solutions to address state and business privacy and security practices that may pose
challenges to interoperable health information exchange'").'
These are informative as to the proposed U.S. Electronic Interoperable Health
Record ("EIHR") architecture and will be discussed further below.'
Together these technologies are the future of patient safety information in the
United States. CPOEs, RFIDs, and Electronic Medical Records (EMRs) will
constitute the key collectors or originators of patient safety information. Data
processing that takes place in CDSS and EHR systems will directly feed back into
patient care, while the outcomes research that will be enabled by EHR data will
first flow into evidence-based research before closing the patient safety
information "loop" by informing CDSS and EHR systems. Electronic records
systems (EMRs and EHRs) are not only the most important for their potential
effects on healthcare costs and quality, but also as a point of intersection for all
other patient safety systems. However, they are by far the most expensive to
125. See, e.g., Steve Lohr, Health Industy Under Pressure to Computerize, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19,
2005, at Cl.
126. National Coordinator for Heal th Information Technology; Development and Adoption
of a National Health Information Network, 69 Fed. Reg. 65599 (Nov. 15, 2004).
127. HHS, Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology, Summay
of Nationwide Health Information Network (NHIN) Request for Information (RFI) Responses (2005),
http://www.os.dhhs.gov/healthit/rfisummaryreport.pdf.
128. HHS Fact Sheet, Health Information Technology Requests for Proposals (2005),
http://www.os.dhhs.gov/healthit/docurnents/RFPfactsheet.pdf.
129. See infra text accompanying note 152 et seq.
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implement, and suggest the most difficult, possibly even intractable legal and
regulatory issues.
III. THE ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORD: MODELS AND STANDARDS
A. Introduction
As should be obvious from the above, there is accelerating progress towards
some form of EHR solution for the United States. As noted by Berner et al.,
What is different now from earlier eras is that two broad policy tracks
related to EHR implementation are likely to converge. One track is a
well-articulated and defensible NHII initiative that proposes
interoperable, ubiquitous, robust EHRs. The second track focuses on
the record of underperformance of our current health care system and
the need to make major improvements in health care quality and safety,
access, and cost. 13°
In May 2005, Secretary Leavitt called the shift to electronic records an
"economic imperative" designed to "maintain health and at the same time
maintain the momentum of our economy, '13' while Leape and Berwick recently
commented, "[tihe electronic health record may be, finally, an idea whose time
has come."'
32
There can be no doubt that tracking, ordering, decision support, and medical
records technologies will create tremendous amounts of patient safety
information. There are, however, difficult questions as to how best to harness
this data. In the sections that follow, these questions are labeled as Conceptual
Model, System Architecture, and Data Standards.
The proposed EIHR is being built on three sets of technologies sets. First,
there are the technologies that create or collect patient safety data (such as CPOE,
CDSS, track-and-trace, and EMR systems). Second, a national EHR system
requires a data infrastructure that permits secure, reliable communication; the
proposed national health information infrastructure ("the set of technologies,
standards, applications, systems, values, and laws that support all facets of
individual health, health care, and public health"'33) will be a secure network built
130. Berner et al., supra note 97, at 6.
131. Esther Landhuis, Health Chief: Put data online, MERCURY NEWS, May 24, 2005, available at
http://www.mercurynews.com/mid/mercurynews/living/health/1 1723708.htm.
132. Leape & Berwick, supra note 11, at 2388.
133. The Nat'l Health Information Infrastructure, Frequently Asked Questions About NHII,
http://aspe.hhs.gov/sp/nhii/Documents/FAQ.pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 2006).
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on top of the existing Internet. Third, the data collected in the various healthcare
information silos must be interoperable and comparable, which requires common
messaging and data standards." 4
B. Ekcrnic Healtb Records: Conceptual Models
According to the IOM, the functional model for the U.S. EHR consists of:
(1) longitudinal collection of electronic health information for and about
persons,
(2) electronic access to person and population-level information by
authorized users,
(3) provision of knowledge and decision-support systems, and
(4) support for efficient processes for health care delivery. 3 -
At the conceptual model stage, EHR architects face several fundamental
questions. First, should they create a full longitudinal record that tracks a
patient's interactions with healthcare providers from cradle to grave (and beyond,
as familial genomic data is increasingly referenced); or, in the alternative, should
some type of excerpted or summary record be adopted? Second, assuming either
a longitudinal or summary EHR is used, how does the data contained in
individual provider information silos (e.g., EMRs) find its way into an EHR? Are
the individual records linked in some way or are the records (or portions thereof)
exported to the longitudinal (or summary) EHR? Third, there is the operational
question-if individual patient information is to be exported to some type of
EHR, will it be "pulled" (typically in some automated manner) or "pushed" (a
semi-automated scenario that is more likely to be under the control of individual
physicians or patients)?
The first question, whether to use a longitudinal or summary record, is further
confused by the different types of extant non-longitudinal models. While an
EMR (the record maintained by a single provider) is, by definition, an information
silo, it must be recognized that not all silos are created equal. Thus, an EMR
maintained by a very large, integrated provider potentially would contain data
similar to that found in a longitudinal EHR.' 3
At the opposite extreme to the system-wide EMR, technologies already permit
patients to maintain their own EHR. This has been described as the "Personal
EHR:"' 37 a subscription, web-based personal database of medical information that
is collected and maintained by the patient, who then controls if and to what extent
134. See, e.g., UNIFORM DATA STANDARDS, supra note 103, at 19.
135. IOM, PATIENT SAFETY: ACHIEVING A NEW STANDARD FOR CARE 3 n.1 (2004).
136. See, e.g., the discussion of the Kaiser system, supra note 82.
137. Gunter & Terry, supra note 90.
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it is shared with providers. 3 Recently CMS issued an RFI requesting input on
how best it should make data about its Medicare beneficiaries available for
incorporation into such personal EHRs.'
39
Lying somewhere between the EMR "silo" and the longitudinal EHR is the
Continuity of Care Record ("CCR"). The CCR is a specification being developed
by the Health Information Management and Systems Society ("HIMSS") and
various professional bodies.' Essentially, CCR defines a common text export
format ("XML"'41) from existing proprietary EMR systems that would allow
portability of summary data'42 that could be given to a patient (through a web
interface or loaded on a flash drive or smart card) or transferred directly to the
patient's next provider.43 CCR architects stress that it is distinct from, but not
inconsistent with longitudinal EHR models.' 4
In the words of a Journal of American Medical Association ("JAMA")
editorial, "[p]atient care is a team sport, and clinicians, patients, and family should
be members of the team."' 45 During the transition to a fully interoperable
longitudinal EHR system, record fragments carried by patients will likely be an
138. E.g., iHealthRecord, http://www.ihealthrecord.org (last visited Oct. 31, 2005); CapMed's
Personal Health Record, http://www.capmed.com/products.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2005). See
general4 Laura Landro, Higb-teeh Tools Heo Patients Manage own Medical Records, DESERET MORNING
NEWS, Feb. 28, 2005, availabk at http://www.deseretnews.com.
139. CMS Personal Health Records RFI 01, Request for Information Centers for Medicare &
Medicaid Services' Rok in Personal Health Records (2005),
http://www2.eps.gov/spg/HHS/HCFA/AGG/Reference%2DNumber/ 2DCMSRFIOESSA
Cl/Attachments.html.
140. See Medical Records Institute, The Concept Paper of the CCR,
http://www.medrecinst.com/pages/about.asp?id=54 (last visited Oct. 31, 2005) [hereinafter
Concept Paper of the CCR].
141. See general#W3C, Extensible Markup Language (XML), http://www.w3.org/XML (last
visited Oct. 31, 2005).
142. Concept Paper of the CCR, supra note 140.
143. See general# Kibbe et al., supra note 87.
144. Concept Paper of the CCR, supra note 140.
Although the CCR is meant to address the need for continuity of care from
one provider or practitioner to any other practitioner, it is not designed to be
a mini EHR. Lab and x-ray and other testing results are included only to the
extent the provider completing the document finds them relevant. It does not
list symptoms as its primary function. Rather it lists diagnoses and the
"Reason for Referral" to the next provider or diagnostician. The "Reason for
Referral" may include problems or symptoms but not in the manner in which
a traditional EHR uses them as the starting point for a documentation of the
SOAP-type note. Nor does it include a chronology of events, in the fashion
expected in an EHR.
145. Nancy C. Elder & John Hickner, Missing Cknical Information, The System Is Down, 293
JAMA, 617, 619 (2005).
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important part of the records system, just as "sneakemet"' 16 was prior to the
maturation of enterprise-wide networks.
The world's most mature summary EHR model is Australia's
HealthConnect.'47 HealthConnect does not create a true longitudinal record but
aggregates elements extracted from a patient's existing EMR(s).'8 The elements
extracted are known as "event summaries," defined as "electronic overview of a
visit to a doctor or hospital, or some other health care event [containing] only the
information that is relevant to the future health and care of the consumer, rather
than the comprehensive notes that a doctor may keep as a record of a
consultation."' 49 HealthConnect utilizes a "push" model whereby data is sent
from the local EMR to a centralized HealthConnect record. This should be
contrasted to the proposed U.S. EHR model that seems to adopt a "pull" model
whereby the centralized EHR system (or another EMR system) initiates a data
request from a provider's record. Not only is the HealthConnect "event
summary" less than a complete record, but it is the patient (in consultation with
the relevant physician) who controls what data is included in the summary record
and who may view it.' s°
As evidenced by its RFI and RFPs, ONCHIT seems committed to an
interoperable EHR, or EIHR-the "nationwide sharing of health information in
patient-care and public-health settings.''. What is notable about the U.S. EIHR
project as originally conceived by IOM and NCVHS, and now by ONCHIT, is
that summary or excerpted alternatives to a longitudinal model do not seem to
have been considered. In part, this may be excused (or at least explained) by the
highly technical path onto which the U.S. project has been directed; one of
technical data standards rather than conceptual models. However, the current
trajectory of this model has serious autonomy and privacy implications that are
addressed later in this article.
C. Electronic Interoperable Health RecordArchitecture
As currently envisaged, the U.S. EIHR likely will not "exist" in any specific
location. In that respect, therefore, it will not be like a hospital's EMR, a
HealthConnect summary record, or even a personal EHR. The EIHR model
instead contemplates data from EMRs in physician offices, hospitals, and health
146. Webopedia, Sneakernet, http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/S/sneakernet.html (last
visited Oct. 31, 2005).
147. See generalb Health Connect, A Health Information Network for All Australians,
http://www.healthconnect.gov.au (last visited Oct. 31, 2005).
148. Terry, supra note 77, at 32-33.
149. See Health Connect, Event Summaries,http://www.healthconnect.gov.au/building/
Event.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2005).
150. See Health Connect, Privacy, http://www.healthconnect.gov.au/building/Privacy.htm
(last visited Oct. 31, 2005).
151. HHS Fact Sheet, supra note 128, at 3.
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plans being interoperable, flowing between the EMRs and continually updating
each other. As one EMR technologist has described it, this will be "a system of
standards rather than a standard system.
' ' 52
The technical (if not regulatory) parallels to HIPAA are transparent. For most
healthcare workers and many lawyers, "HIPAA"'5 s bespeaks the regulation of
healthcare privacy (actually confidentiality). In actuality, the healthcare
"Administrative Simplification" provisions' that enabled the controversial
HIPAA privacy and security regulations,-" were primarily designed to mandate
healthcare transactional standards. The patient protections were enacted because
of the increased privacy costs that the transactional system engendered and to
limit how providers could externalize those risks to their patients.', At a
conceptual level, the EIHR will complete the HIPAA-EDI model (that already
must contend with claims attachments involving health data) and, at the process
level, will share much of the EDI's informational infrastructure.
ONCHIT's development of an EIHR model seems to have two components:
(1) continued encouragement of Regional Health Information Organizations
("RHIOs"; 5 7 and (2) development of a Nationwide Health Information Network
("NHIN").15 8 As to the former, the Frist-Clinton bill likely indicates a sense of
ONCHIT's thinking by proposing monies be made available to "award
competitive grants to eligible entities to implement regional or local health
information plans to improve healthcare quality and efficiency through the
electronic exchange of health information...""s These RHIOs will operate both
as demonstration projects and as foundations for the NHIN if the final
architecture remains decentralized." °
As to the latter, ONCHIT's RFP looks to "develop and evaluate prototypes
for a NHIN architecture maximizing the use of existing resources such as the
Internet to achieve widespread interoperability among health care software
applications, particularly EHRs." '' No doubt the contracts awarded by
152. Deploying an EMK" The battkforcordatces$, AMEDNEWS.COM, Mar. 7, 2005 (quoting Larry
Albert of Integic).
153. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, § 263,
110 Stat. 1936, 2031 (1996).
154. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d (2000).
155. 45 C.F.R. § 160, 164 (2004).
156., See generaly Nicolas P. Terry, An eHealtb Dtfych: The Impact of Pivazy Regulation on Medical
Errr and Maoratice L'tgation, 27 AM. J.L. & MED. 361, 363-66 (2001).
157. See general# HHS/ONCHIT, Regional Health Information Organizations (RHIOs),
http://www.hhs.gov/healthit/rhio.html. (last visited Oct. 31, 2005).
158. ONCHIT, Developing a Protoype for a Nationwide Health Informaion Network Arrhitecture,
http://www.hhs.gov/healthit/nhindemos.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2005).
159. Health Technology to Enhance Quality Act of 2005, S. 1262,109th Cong. § 2908 (2005).
160. See general# Health Information Technology, HHS Is Taking Steps to Deveop a National
Strategy (2005), availabk at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05628.pdf.
161. Developing a Prototype for a Nationwide Health Information Network Architecture 2,
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ONCHIT will begin to answer some of the second level architecture questions
posed by national or regional EIHRs, such as whether interoperability will lead
to the creation of a separate, warehoused EHR, or whether (as seems more likely)
existing records systems will contain "pointers" enabling authorized users to pull
patient data from other records systems.
D. Patient Safety Information Data Standards
Assuming there is a physical communications infrastructure and secure
transport and application levels," a national or regional EHR model (whether
summary or longitudinal) requires two core sets of data standards. The first is for
data interchange formats, the second is for encoding specific data types (or health
vocabulary) used in an EHR.
The challenge differs from something like the CCR because of the
sophistication and complexity of the data to be exported and the requirement that
this rich data can be imported and exported by multiple systems. For example,
a model like CCR merely exports a patient data summary or a discrete piece of
data into a generally readable text format. In contrast, a longitudinal record
requires far more robust and complex data, such as granular data as to medication
and diagnosis. This data must be presented in a consistent format. Furthermore,
the projected uses of the data go far further than simple text export; full
interoperability requires that data contained in a patient's record interact with
patient safety data elsewhere (such as drug interactions or CPG databases) and
then "return" to the patient record better informed. Finally, data in individual
records also must be capable of deidentified extraction for reporting purposes.
An agreed set of data interchange standards provide a sophisticated electronic
"envelope" for the data to be exchanged. In this regard, an EHR system requires,
like HIPAA's transactional model, an Electronic Data Interchange ("EDI")
standard. The agreed standard is responsible for determining "which pieces of
information are mandatory for a particular document, which pieces are optional
and give the rules for the structure of the document."'6 3 Some of the identifier
and messaging standards"M adopted by the federal government, pursuant to
HIPAA of 1996,165 to create our national healthcare transactional system (an
http:// fs2.eps.gov/EPSData/HHS/Synopses/4607/Reference-Number-ONCHIT-
3/ONCHITFinalRFP-NationwidePrototypel.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2005).
162. See, e.g., Wikipedia, InternetPrtoolSit, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intemet_ protocol-
suite (last visited Oct. 31, 2005).
163. Wikipedia, Ektronic Data Interehange, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electronic_Data
-Interchange (last visited Oct. 31, 2005).
164. See general~ HHS, Administrave Simpkflatiaon in the Health Care Industr,
http://aspe.hhs.gov/admnsimp/index.shtml (last visited Nov. 6, 2005). An example would be
standards developed by ASC X12, http://www.x12.org (last visited Oct. 31, 2005).
165. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, § 263,
110 Stat. 1936,2031. HIPAA-EDI transactions, such as health plan enrollment, eligibility, payment
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electronic data interchange or EDI system) are transferable to an EHR system.
In the interim, these messaging formats for clinical data (as they will be used in
EHRs) have been further developed by organizations such as Health Level 7
("HL7"),'6 Digital Imaging and Communications in Medicine ("DICOM"), 67
and the National Council for Prescription Drug Programs."6 The EHR standard
for administrative data (for example healthcare transactions, billing and insurance
information) is ASC X12169 as used for the HIPAA EDI. The data exchange (or
messaging) standard for clinical data is HL7.1'
The more difficult (and patient safety information specific) challenge is to
specify the standards required for EHR data to achieve what NCVHS refers to
as semantic interoperability and comparability, such that "the meaning of data is
consistent when shared among different parties."'' Here, both NCVHS172 and
IOMI7 3 have recommended the adoption of core terminologies dealing with, for
example, disease (ICD-9-CM174), medical procedures and services (CPT-417 ), and
drug names or doses (e.g., RxNorm17). Considerable development is also
underway to standardize event taxonomy (such as adverse event or near-miss
reporting)17 7 and to capture knowledge representation (such as clinical practice
guidelines). Consistent with this approach, the CHI Initiative has identified the
necessary data and messaging domains and is in the process of adopting or
and remittance advice, claims, health plan premium payments, health claim status, and referral
certification and authorization are dependent on messaging formats, transaction codes, and data
element codes that are conceptually related to those being developed for EHR systems.
166. See general# Robert H. Dolin et al., The H7 Clinical DocumentArbitecture, 8 J. AM. MED.
INFORMATICS ASS'N 552, 552-569 (2001).
167. Digital Imaging and Communications in Medicine, http://medical.nema.org (last visited
Oct. 31, 2005).
168. The National Council for Prescription Drug Programs, http://www.ncpdp.org (last
visited Oct. 31, 2005).
169. See The Accredited Standards Committee (ASC X12), http://www.xl2.org (last visited
Nov. 5, 2005). Specifically, see The X12N Insurance subcommittee, http://www.x12.org
/xl2org/subcommittees/schome.cfm?strSC=N&CFID=640006&CFTOKEN=37253298 (last
visited Oct. 31, 2005).
170. See Health Level Seven, http://www.hl7.org (last visited Oct. 31, 2005).
171. UNIFORM DATA STANDARDS, supra note 103, at 6.
172. Letter from John Lumpkin, spra note 103.
173. KEY CAPABILITIES OF AN ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORD SYSTEM, supra note 79.
174. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Nat'l Ctr for Health Statistics, Classification
ofDiseases and Funectioning & Disabikty, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/about/otheract/icd9/abticd9.htm
(last visited Oct. 31, 2005).
175. American Medical Ass'n, CPT Process -How a Code Becomes a Code, http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama/pub/category/3882.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2006).
176. Nat'l Library Medicine, RxNorm, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/research/umls/rxnorrn-
main.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2005).
177. For example, by using SNOMED CT. See http://www.snomed.org/snomedct/
index.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2005); see IOM, spra note 135, at 26.
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developing the technical standards necessary for their exchange (interoperability
and comparability).178
IV. THE LEGAL FRAME FOR PATIENT SAFETY DATA
A. Introdiv'ion
The legal system has failed to articulate clear incentives for HIT adoption, with
healthcare institutions being caught in a trap of facing liability for failing to
implement emerging process-supporting technologies, but equally facing liability
for implementing immature systems.'79 Additionally, emerging technologies likely
will increase provider litigation risks by providing plaintiffs with secure,
unalterable records that better identify all professional-patient contacts, potentially
increasing the defendant pool, while identifying similarly situated patient-
plaintiffs.' 8 There are additional legal risks associated with financial models
designed to address the market failures associated with HIT adoption."8 ' Assume,
for example, that a hospital supplies equipment or financial support to a doctor
to enable access to its EMR. Such an arrangement could contravene the P4ysidan
Sef-ReferralAct, 2 which prohibits a physician with a financial relationship with
a healthcare entity from making certain referrals to that entity. The "Stark II"
regulations contain only a very limited exception in the case of "Community-wide
health information systems.' ' 3 Similarly, criminal penalties could be implicated
because of the Anti-Kckback Statute. 84
This section of the article explores two aspects of process-supporting
technologies that have critical legal implications, yet which have received
insufficient attention amid the political and industry enthusiasm for the new
technologies. Those two aspects are (1) negative externalities relating to privacy,
and (2) negative externalities relating to error.
In fairness, it must be acknowledged that EIHR-related discussion of
autonomy or privacy may have been minimal because development has operated
178. For a detailed listing of domains and the adoption of standards for each, see HHS,
Standards Adoption Recommendation,
http://www.hhs.gov/healthit/documents/chiinitiadve/CHlExecSummaries.pdf (last visited Oct.
31, 2005).
179. See general# Nicolas P. Terry, When the 'Machine That Goes 'Ping "' Causes Harm: Default Torts
Ruks and Technological-Mediated Health Care Injuries, 46 ST. Louis U.L.J. 37 (2002).
180. Terry, supra note 156, at 410-13.
181. See infra text accompanying note 278, et seq.
182. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (2000).
183. Exceptions to the Referral Prohibition Related to Compensation Arrangement, 69 Fed
Reg. 16138, 16142 (Mar. 26, 2004).
184. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b).
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in an almost exclusively technical domain. As the difficult questions of
implementation draw closer, the necessity for the involvement of all stakeholders
and sensitivity to issues that are not purely technical becomes more of an
imperative. There are signs that this is beginning to occur. For example, in a
2004 interview with the British Medical Journal, Dr. Brailer adopted patient-
centric language: "We expect to have a network that securely and in a patient-
controlled manner connects all those electronic health records . . . so that if a
physician is seeing a patient all that patient's information that the patient wants
the doctor to see is made available to them in real time."' 5 Similarly, the
proposed Health Technolog to Enhance Quali0y Act of 200518 is far more tuned to
privacy concerns and stakeholders, and the AHIC's first listed goal relates to
protecting privacy as well as security.
18 7
B. Ptivay and Autonomy Externaliies
1. In General
As HIT finds traction, we should find comfort in robust health privacy; a
social good that is protected by the powerful triumvirate of ethical constraints,
effective laws, and operational necessities. The reality is quite different. State and
federal privacy law may be omnipresent, the pages of medical journals and law
reviews may be filled with exhortations of confidentiality, and voyeurism-enabling
media may be quick to pounce on system failures, but health information privacy
is surprisingly fragile. The best evidence of its perilous condition is that the issue
has become politicized. Take, for example, then HHS Secretary Thompson's
2001 characterization of the Administration's approach to HIPAA health privacy,
"President Bush wants strong patient privacy protections put in place now," and
to the federal standards intent to give "patients peace of mind in knowing that
their medical records are indeed confidential and their privacy is not vulnerable
to intrusion."'"
Contrast that comforting proclamation with the actions and words of the same
Administration's Department of Justice ("DOJ") in 2004. Seeking the medical
records of some forty-five patients of a physician who was challenging the validity
of the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003,89 the DOJ argued before the
federal courts that federal law "does not recognize a physician-patient.
185. Anne Harding, Interview with Nat'l Health Info. Tee. Coordinator David Brailer, MD, PhD, 4
BMJ 328, 328 (2004).
186. Health Technology to Enhance Quality Act of 2005, S. 1262, 109th Cong. (2005).
187. HHS Fact Sheet, supra note 122.
188. HHS, Statement by HHS Sec Tommy G. Thompson Regarding the Patient Privasy Rule (2001),
http://aspe.hhs.gov/admnsimp/final/press4.htm.
189. 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2005).
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.privilege"'9 and that patients "no longer possess a reasonable expectation that
their histories will remain completely confidential."'' While Scott McNealy's
infamous remark, "You have zero privacy anyway. Get'over it,' 92 is not generally
true of health information, such protection is perhaps more fragile than generally
thought in a post-HIPAA world.
2. Electronic Health Records
A fully longitudinal, interoperable records model fits the "perfect storm"
profile of privacy advocates. The privacy externalities of medical data have been
limited because of the inefficient data silos being used. Risks have been further
reduced by the general lack of portability of paper records and the inexpensive
security regimens (such as locked file cabinets) that apply to paper. In contrast,
an EIHR model is premised on the aggregation of these silos, common data
standards, and (to improve usability and maximize the return on EMR/EHR
investments) the increased sophistication of data mining tools. Making patient
safety information available to all healthcare providers, that are even tangentially
involved in a patient's care, renders the level of privacy and security accorded
that data a function of the weakest link in the system. Fully interoperable data is
also immeasurably more valuable for secondary uses (e.g., marketing) and is an
irresistibly tempting target for commercial aggregators
9 3
Even a cursory look at newspaper stories from around the country suggests
that, in spite of HIPAA protections, our privacy and security systems remain quite
dysfunctional. For example, reports during 2005 include stolen laptop computers
containing medical data,' the theft of a computer disk containing medical and
190. This is a correct if surprising statement of the law. See Nw. Mem'l Hosp. v. Ashcroft, 362
F.3d 923, 926 (7th Cit. 2004).
191. Robert Pear & Eric U1chtblau, Administraton Sets Forth A Limited View on Privag, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 6,2004, at A8 (quoting the Justice Dept.). The issue was raised in several district court
cases, Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc. v. Ashcroft, No. C 03-4872 PJH, 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3383 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2004); Nat'l Abortion Fed'n v. Ashcroft, No. 03 Civ. 8695, 2004
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4530 (S.D. N.Y. Mar. 18,2004); Citizens for Health v. Thompson, No. 03-2267,
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5745 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 2,2004), prior to the Seventh Circuit's opinion in Nw.
Mem'l Hosp. v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 923, 926 (7th Cir. 2004) (quashing government's subpoena).
Thereafter the administration withdrew its request for the documents. Terry Freiden, U.S. Drops
Fight to Get Abocion Records, CNN (2004),
http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/04/27/abortion.records.
192. Drew Clark, Sun's Privatq Officer Vorksr to Enhance Firm's Secutriy, NAT'LJ. TECH. DAILY,
Nov. 14, 2003 (comment attributed to Scott McNealy, Chairman and CEO, Sun Microsystems in
1999).
193. See generalt4 Andrew Ross Sorkin & Steve Lohr, VINU Is Nearing Deal to Buy IMS Health
for $6.7 Bil'on, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2005, at A15 (reporting acquisition of IMS Health by Dutch
market research company VNU, to gain access to U.S. pharmaceutical business research).
194. Gary Delsohn, Laptop Stolen; State Fears ID Theft, SACRAMENTO BEE, May 28,2005, at A3,
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financial information relating to 200,000 patients,95 the hacking of HIT
systems,96 a disgruntled ex-employee of a managed care corporation linking her
blog to the medical information of 140 patients,"g the theft of computer backups
containing the personal information of 57,000 Blue Cross Blue Shield
customers, 9 ' and Cleveland Clinic executives and security guards running through
the streets to retrieve 3,000 patient records that fell from a truck and blew away.' 99
Ominously, a Wall Street Journal article in 2005 reported that identity thieves
regularly target hospital and nursing home patients because of the relative
exposure of their social security numbers and other key identifiers while in a
healthcare environment." °
Of course, the "answer" to health information privacy externalities should be
HIPAA's privacy 2°' and security 2 regulations. However, the HIPAA model is
hugely flawed in concept, terminology, and implementation. 3 First and crucially,
like most common law and state statutory protections that preceded the federal
regulations, HIPAA does not in any way protect patientptivag--it merely places
confidentiaftiy-based limitations on information provided to healthcare entities.
Worse, it expends most of its energy on the process of patient consent to
disclosure. Second, its "more stringent" partial preemption rule guarantees a
growing vector between federal and state laws.' Third, the HIPAA standards
available at http://www.sacbee.com/content/politics/story/12968265p-13815437c.html (a laptop
computer stolen from a car in California contained names, Social Security numbers and personal
health information for 21,600 Medi-Cal recipients).
195. Cbaqes in Patient Recors Theft, MERCURY NEWS, May 14,2005, at lB.
196. Jean P. Fisher, Hacker Hits Duke System; Personal Data, Passwords Taken, NEWS &
OBSERVER, June 4, 2005, at D1.
197. Kaireraddsto its lawsuit against blo ger, MERCURY NEWS, Mar. 18,2005, at 1C. See also News
Release, State of California, Department of Managed Health Care Orders Bay Area Blogger to
Remove Kaiser Patient Information from Web (Mar. 17, 2005), available at
http://www.dmhc.ca.gov/library/reports/ news/BApr.pdf. Subsequently, Kaiser was fined by the
state Department of Managed Health Care for the security breach. Pnvaiy bremah costs Kaiser$200,000
Fine For Leaving Patient Information On Pubi'c Web Site, MERCURY NEWS, June 21, 2005, available at
http://www.mercurynews.com/mld/ mercurynews/living/health/11946337.htm.
198. Matt Hanson, Medical Firm's Files with Personal Data Stolen, Key Information on 57,000 at Risk,
ARIz. REPUBLIC, July 13, 2005, availabke at http://www.azcentral.com/arizonarepublic/business/
articles/0713biodynel3.htmnl.
199. Medical Reords Jam Ceveland Tranf, SCIENCE DAILY, Apr. 6, 2005, available at
http://www.sciencedaily.com/upi/?feed=TopNews&article=UPI-1-20050406-15294000-bc-us-
medrecords.xml.
200. Kevin Helliker, A New Medical Worty: Identit Thieves Find Ways to Taet Hospital Patients,
WALL ST.J., Feb. 22, 2005, at D1.
201. 45 C.F.R. S 164.500-534 (2004).
202. 45 C.F.R. S 164.302-318 (2004).
203. Nicolas P. Terry, What's WIrong with Health Privay?, in THE LAW AND BIOETHICS (Ana
Smith Iltis & Sandra H. Johnson eds., London, Roudledge) (forthcoming 2006).
204. 45 C.F.R. § 160.202 (2004).
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contain extremely broad carve-outs (public health, judicial, and regulatory) that
do not require patient consent to data processing.2°  Fourth, the privacy
standards are still too lax regarding secondary uses of patient information.
20 6
Fifth, there is a growing concern about the rigor demonstrated by the Office of
Civil Rights in enforcing the regulations.2°v
Some more granular criticisms are particularly relevant in the context of an
EIHR system. First, as is well known, when the HIPAA privacy standards were
first promulgated, they required that patients be allowed to consent to disclosure
for treatment, payment, or healthcare operations purposes.2 When amended by
the Bush Administration, this requirement for consent was removed.. 9 and
replaced by the permissive statement that "[a] covered entity may obtain consent
of the individual to use or disclose protected health information to carry outr " n,,211
treatment, payment, or health care operations. Second, the HIPAA regulation
makes no attempt to narrow the flow of patient health information to the "circle
of care"-the healthcare providers dirct# involved in the patient's current
diagnosis or treatment. Although the regulations contain a general "minimum
necessary" proportionality rule,2" it is inapplicable to "[d]isclosures to or requests
by a health care provider for treatment[.]
2 12
Finally, HIPAA applies only to healthcare entities,2"3 a relatively narrow
purview given the range of U.S. and offshore players likely to be involved in EHR
data processing. Already half of the $20 billion U.S. medical transcription
industry is outsourced outside the United States.2"4 and data processing involved
after the launch of a complete U.S. EHR program is surely to follow. Offshore
data processors of PIHI are "business associates" 215 of HIPAA "covered
entities ' 21 6 and, as such, their contractual relationships must contain certain
205. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512 (2004).
206. Seegener4 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.508, 164.510 (2004).
207. See, e.g., Peter P. Swire, Justice Department Opinion Undermines Protection of Medical Privag,
CTR. AM.. PROGRESS (2005), http://www.americanprogress.org/site/pp.asp?c=biJRJ8OVF&b
=743281&printmode=1.
208. 45 C.F.R. § 164.506 (2001).
209. 45 C.F.R. § 164.506(a) (2004).
210. 45 C.F.R. § 164.506(b)(1) (2004).
211. 45 C.F.RK § 164.502(b) (1) (2004) ("When using or disclosing protected health information
or when requesting protected health information from another covered entity, a covered entity
must make reasonable efforts to limit protected health information to the minimum necessary to
accomplish the intended purpose of the use, disclosure, or request.").
212. 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(b)(2)(i) (2004).
213. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2004).
214. David Lazarus, Looking Offshore: Outsour-ed UCSF Notes Highight Privay Risk, How One
Offshore Worker Sent Tremor Througb Medical System, S.F. CHRONICLE, Mar. 28, 2004, available at
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/ardcle.cgi?file=/c/a/2004/03/28/MNGFS308R264.DTL.
215. 45 C.F.R § 160.103 (2004).
216. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2004).
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HIPAA limitations on data protection."7 In an answer to an inquiry by
Congressman Markey about outsourcing of sensitive data outside of the United
States, then HHS Secretary Thompson admitted that his department failed to
document the "nature or content" of the contracts between covered entities and
their business associates, or directly regulate offshore business associates.218 As
the costs of the EIHR adventure increase (as assuredly they will), providers and
data clearinghouses will be tempted to use off-shore data rocessing and storage.
Already, we are seeing proposed federal2"9 and state' legislation aimed at
penalizing corporations that fail to disclose security breaches"' and attempting to
control "outsourcing" of sensitive, data storage or processing outside of the
United States.
Finally, all those involved in the development of the U.S. EIHR system must
acknowledge an elephant in the room-the Department of Homeland Security
and its vital and continuing fight against terrorism and (particularly in this
context) bioterrorism.m Recently, the HHS Office of Civil Rights added the
question: "Does the [HIPAA] Privacy Rule create a government database of all
individuals' personal health information?" to its HIPAA privacy FAQ.3 Its
cogent and straightforward answer to the possibly paranoid questioner was: "No.
The Privacy Rule does not create such a government database or require a
physician or any other covered entity to send medical information to the Federal
government for a government database or similar operation." 4 The difficulty,
of course, is that once a national EIHR is in place, the answer to this question
will, of necessity, have to be far more nuanced.
At the very least, the HIPAA regulations will require amendments to make
clear that all EIHR and other health IT generated patient information is covered;
217. 45 C.F.R. § 164.504(e) (2004).
218. Letter from Tommy G. Thompson, Sec'y of Health & Human Services to Edward J.
Markey, Congressman, U.S. House of Representatives 2 (June 14,2004) (on file with author).
219. See, e.g., Personal Data Offshoring Protection Act of 2004, H.R.4366, 108th Cong. (2d
Sess. 2004).
220. E.g., S.B. 1492 (Ca. 2004) (vetoed by Governor Schwarzenegger Sept. 2004). See Steve
Lawrence, Scbwartenegger Vetoes Bill to Prevent Outsouring ofJobs, S.F. CHRONICLE, Sept. 30, 2004,
availableathttp://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file= /news/archive/2004/09/30/state2258
EDT0266.DTL.
221. See generall Brian Krebs, States Keep WatcfulEye on Peronal-Data Firms, WASH. POST, June
1, 2005, availabk at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/06/01/
AR2005060100359.html.
222. Seegeneraly U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security, http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic (last visited
Oct. 31, 2005).
223. HHS, Questions & Answers, http://answers.hhs.gov/cgi-bin/hhs.cfg/php/enduser/std
alp.php?p sid=xPmDQ6Gg&pjva=&pli=&ppage=l&pscatjlvll =7&p.cat-lvl2=%7Eany




a position taken by the proposed Health Technolog to Enhance_0uaity Act of2005.225
In addition, the level of patient and physician trust (and, ultimately, participation)
will be a function of their ability to choose the data that is included, a far tighter
sense of the "circle of care," and curtailment of some of the carve-outs from the
confidentiality standard.
3. Radio Frequency Identification
The privacy implications of tracking technologies are less well known. Privacy
advocates, such as the Electronic Privacy Information Center ("EPIC")"6 and
Consumers Against Supermarket Privacy Invasion and Numbering
("CASPIAN")," 7 are concerned that the tags will be used by enterprises for
intense customer profiling both inside and outside their stores (either by not
disabling the tags at checkout or by insinuating the tags into customer loyalty
cards'). The fear is that the data will be read by third parties (from criminals to
the government), removing all vestiges of privacy.' In contrast, those opposed
to RFID-specific privacy regulation believe that technological and cost limitations
will place natural impediments in the way of this Orwellian vision, while blocking
technologies and existing legal schema will take care of any residual concerns.'
Most of the discussion has been at the level of general consumer goods rather
than specifically with regard to the healthcare environment. However, EPIC has
urged HHS to adopt a "Four Tier Approach" to RFID; tier 1 being the bulk
distribution of products (where there is no privacy risk); tier 2 being the product
distribution to the patient (where it should be considered PHI and protected by
HIPAA); tier 3 being the temporary identification of patients (implicating HIPAA
security and identity theft), and; tier 4 being the permanent identification of
patients (with privacy implication so profound that HHS should prohibit the
practice).231
225. Health Technology to Enhance Quality Act of 2005, S. 1262,109th Cong. § 2907 (2005).
226. Electronic Privacy Info. Ctr. ("EPIC"), http://www.epic.org (last visited Oct. 31,2005).
227. Consumers Against Supermarket Privacy Invasion & Numbering,
http://www.nocards.org (last visited Oct. 31, 2005).
228. See, e.g., PRADA RFID Technology, http://www.ideo.com/casestudies/prada.asp.X=2.
("An RFID tag is also part of a PRADA customer card. Customer preferences are stored on the
database, and only the customer card provides access. This information is used to customize the
sales experience and further enhance the service provided to the card-holding customer.") (last
visited Oct. 31, 2005).
229. See generallj EPIC, Radio Frequent7 Identification (RFID) Sjstems,
http://www.epic.org/privacy/rfid/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2005).
230. RFID Tags and Ptivagy, supra note 40, at 7-12.
231. Marc Rotenberg, President, EPIC, Presentation at the Dept. of Health and Human
Servs.: Privacy Implications of RFID Technology in Health Care Settings Gan. 11, 2005),
http://www.epic.org/privacy/rfid/rfid_ncvhs l_05.ppt.
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The only federal agency primarily concerned with healthcare to directly address
RFID implementation has been the FDA. 2 The FDA approved implantable
RFID medical devices 3 and, as part of its counterfeit drugs policy, has issued a
"Compliance Policy Guide" for RFID to encourage pilot projects.
234
In most cases involving healthcare institutions, HIPAA will apply to bar code
and RFID, data because those technologies fall under the definition of
"identifier" of PHI.23s Nevertheless, it has been suggested that healthcare
providers using RFID technologies adopt a code of conduct.' Such a code
would reiterate obvious provider obligations, such as notice, specific consent, and
data amendment, but would also, for example, address RFID-specific issues such
as the provider policy on RFID data retention and how patients can deactivate the
RFID chips.n7
RFID privacy issues will implicate a patchwork of federal and state consumer
protection laws. For example, California recently reached a settlement under its
unfair competition law with an automobile rental company that failed to notify
its customers that it was tracking their movements using GPS devices.213
Some Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is also relevant. The worst fear of
privacy advocates is that the federal government will make surveillance use of
essentially invisible, potentially intrusive, RFID trackers. While some drug
diversion cases will likely play out that way, private actors have the most to gain.
Nevertheless, the Fourth Amendment cases are useful in getting a sense of
judicial attitudes towards the public's expectations of privacy. The relevant line
of cases dates back to Katz v. UnitedStates . 9 There, the Supreme Court overruled
the holding in Goldman v. United States" that electronic surveillance without
physical penetration of premises by a tangible object did not violate the Fourth
232. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Radiofrrqueng Identification Feasibiliy Studies and Pilot Programs
for Drugs, Guidance for FDA Staff and Industy (2004), http://www.fda.gov/oc/initiatives/
counterfeit/rfidcpg.html. Outside of the healthcare environment, the Department of Defense has
announced a wide-ranging RFID policy. See Department of Defense, News Release No. 775-03,
DoD Announces Radio Frequency Identification Policy (Oct. 23, 2003), availabk at
http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2003/nr20031023-0568.html.
233. Surgichip, supra note 44.
234. U.S. Food and Drug Admin., supra note 232.
235. "Any other unique identifying number, characteristic, or code, except as permitted by
paragraph (c) of this section .... 45 C.F.R. §164.514(b)(2)()(R) (2004).
236. Lisa J. Sotto, An RFID Code of Conduct, RFID J., May 30, 2005, availabk at
http://www.rfidjournal.com/article/aricleview/1624/1/128.
237. Id.
238. News Release, Office of the Attorney General California Department of Justice,
Attorney General Lockyer Announces Consumer Protection Settlement with Bay Area Rental Car
Firm (Nov. 9, 2004), available at http://caag.state.ca.us/newsalerts/2004/04-129.htm.
239. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 362 (1967).
240. Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 135 (1942).
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Amendment." In Kat. Justice Harlan famously wrote "[Goldman's] limitation on
Fourth Amendment protection is, in the present day, bad physics as well as bad
law, for reasonable expectations of privacy may be defeated by electronic as well
as physical invasion. '  By analogy, in Kyllo v. United States, the Supreme Court
ruled that law enforcement's use of thermal imaging technology to view the
interior of a residence" was impermissible. In a subsequent case, the Court
emphasized the core of Kyllo; that the protection of a "legitimate expectation that
information about perfectly lawful activity will remain private", and that the
technology in Kyllo "was capable of detecting lawful activity-in that case,
intimate details in a home, such as 'at what hour each night the lady of the house
takes her daily sauna and bath."' 2" Privacy advocates will undoubtedly bear those
words in mind when patients, or their prescriptions, are tracked by the new
technologies.
C. Errr Externaklies
There is now some limited evidence of a positive correlation between
significant institutional investment in HIT and reduced mortality rates.245
However, much of the medical literature examining process-supporting HIT has
concentrated on failed expectations. In the words of Wears and Berg: "Behind
the cheers and high hopes that dominate conference proceedings, vendor
information, and large parts of the scientific literature, the reality is that systems
that are in use in multiple locations, that have satisfied users, and that effectively
and efficiently contribute to the quality and safety of care are few and far
between."2'
There are several possible liability issues for healthcare institutions and health
IT suppliers arising from error-reducing technologies. Those issues include
institutional failure to introduce the new technologies, transitional problems
relating to staff training, the existence of legacy or parallel systems, and system or
appliance failures relating to the technologies themselves.247
Recent reports suggest that all is not rosy in the garden of error-reducing
technologies. Some of this has been apocryphal, with newspaper reports of error-
241. Kat-, 389 U.S. at 362 (1967).
242. Id.
243. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
244. Illinois v. Caballes, 125 S. Ct. 834,838 (2005); Cf. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207,215
(1986) (no reasonable expectation of privacy from aerial surveillance).
245. Hospitals & Health Networks, 2005 Most Wired Survey and Benchmarking Study, The
Search For Meaning: Does Information Technolog Make A Difference? (2005), available at
http://www.hospitalconnect.com/hhnmag/jsp/articledisplay.jsp?dcrpath=HHNMAG/PubsN
ewsArticle/data/0507HHNCoverStoryLanding.Page&doman=HHNMAG.
246. Wears & Berg, supra note 19, at 1261.
247. Terry, supra note 156, at 410-13.
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prone and physician-unfriendly systems causing problems,2" while the nation's
largest EMR implementation, the Department of Defense's CHCS II system,
249
crashed in the spring of 2004.2 One estimate suggests that twenty percent of
medication errors in 2003 involved automated systems.251' Not surprisingly, a
2005 Harris Interactive poll reported that sixty-five percent of respondents were
either "very concerned" or"somewhat concerned" that "[c]omputerization could
increase rather than decrease medical errors. 252
In the medical literature, there has been little research on the patient safety
impact of system-wide EMRs or EHRs. However, Asch et al. report that VHA
patients who are covered by a system-wide EMR (and other quality management
innovations) experienced higher quality of care than a national sample that did not
benefit from such technologies.2 3 Reports regarding CPOE and CDSS
technologies are far less sanguine and cast some doubts on the effectiveness of
these systems.
Perhaps not surprisingly, research suggests reliance on CPOE systems alone
will not solve the adverse drug event ("ADE") problem. Nebeker et al. report
that while the adoption of CPOE systems has a statistically meaningful impact on
input or transcription errors, and tracking technologies reduce administration
errors, these technologies do not address ADEs caused by dosing and interaction.
More elaborate CDSS technologies are required for that task.2"
248. See, e.g., Charles Ornstein, Cahfornia," HospitalHeeds Doctors, Suspends Use of Software; Cedars-
Sinai Physicans EnteredPrescriptions and Oler Orders in it, but Calkdit Unsafe, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2003,
at B1; Lisa Richardson, Kaiser Scrambks to Correct Prescription Mix-Up, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2003, at
B6; Tracy Weber & Charles Ornstein, King/Drew Patient Monitors Shut Off Following 2 Deaths, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 10, 2003, atB1; Ceci Connolly, Cedars-Sinai Doctors Cing to Pen and Paper, WASH. POST.,
Mar. 21, 2005, at A01.
249. Clinical Information Technology Program Office,
http://citpo.ha.osd.mil/ChangeNavf9a.html?SiteNavlD=2&PrirnNavID=143&SecNavID=180
(last visited Oct. 31, 2005).
250. David Glendinning, Deployingan EMR." The Battkfor RecordAccess, AM. MED. NEWS, Mar.
7, 2005, available at http://tricare.osd.nil/eenews/downloads/022805CHCSII.doc.
251. Rob Stein, Automated Systems For Drugs Examined, Report.: Computers Can Add to Errrs,
WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 2004, at A03.
252. Harris Interactive, Health Information Privay (HIPAA) Notices Have Improved Puhc's
Confidence That Their Medical information is Being Handkd Proper, Feb. 24, 2005, at table 5,
http://www.harrisinteractive.com/news/allnewsbydate.asp?NewsID=894 (Expected benefits
outweigh risks to privacy; forty-eight percent. Privacy risks outweigh the expected benefits; forty-
seven percent). Id. at table 6.
253. Steven M. Asch et al., Comparison ofQuaif of Care for Patients in the Veterans Health
Administration and Patients in a National Sampk, 141 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 938, 938-945
(2004), availabk at http://www.annals.org/cgi/reprint/141/12/938.pdf.
254. Jonathan R. Nebeker et al., High Rates of Adverse Drug Events in a High# Computerized
Hospital, 165 ARCH. INTERNAL MED. 1111 (2005); see also Anne Bobb et al., The Epidemiology of
Prescribing Errors: The Potential Impact of Computerized Prescriber Order Enty, 164 ARCH. INTERNAL
MED. 785, 788-90 (2004) (suggesting CPOE systems should be matched to CDSS systems to
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Garg et al. reviewed trials evaluating the impact of CDSS systems."s They
reported a trend suggesting improved practitioner performance, but that "the
effects of these systems on patient health remain understudied---and inconsistent
when studied."' One of these unanswered questions is the extent to which
physicians will ask for help from a CDSS system or adapt their treatment plans
to its recommendation .  Miller et al. have raised questions as to the "one size
fits all" across sub-disciplines approach of widely available commercial systems
and the quality and reliability of the knowledge bases used by these systems."s
More disturbing is the finding by Koppel et al. that CPOE systems actually can
fadlitate medical errors. 9  The authors grouped discovered errors into two
typologies: "Fragmentation and Systems Integration Failure"' and "Human-
Machine Interface Flaws."'" Many of the examples of the former are consistent
with the CPOE-CDSS disconnect previously discussed, such as dosage
information not interlinked with CPGs. The interface flaws identified included
the way CPOE information presentation screen design can lead to the selection
of the wrong patient and the use of multiple screens to display all current
medications.
262
Is this merely a transitional phenomenon, or are there more fundamental
problems? As Wears and Berg note, "[c]linical work, especially in hospitals, is
fundamentally interpretative, interruptive, multitasking, collaborative, distributed,
opportunistic, and reactive. In contrast, CPOE systems and decision support
systems are based on a different model of work: one that is objective, rationalized,
linear, normative, localized (in the clinician's mind), solitary, and single-
minded. , 63
effectively reduce medication errors).
255. Amit Y. Garg et al., Effects of Computerized Cnical Decision Support Systems on Practitioner
Peformance and Patient Outcomes: A Systematic Retiew, 293 JAMA 1223 (2005).
256. Garg, supra note 255, at 1231.
257. See generalb Charles P. Friedman et al., Do Pysidans Know When TheirDiagnosesAlr Comet?
Imphicationsfor Decision Support and Error Reduction, 20 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 334-39 (2005).
258. Randolph A. Miller et al., Cknical Dedon Support and Ekctronic Presctihing Systems: A Time
for Responsibk Thought andAction, 12 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS Ass'N. 403 (2005).
259. Ross Koppel et al., Rok of Computerized Pysidan OrderEnhy Systems in Facilitating Medication
Errors, 293 JAMA 1197 (2005).
260. Id. at 1199-1200.
261. Id. at 1200-01.
262. See alroJan Horsky et al., ComprehensiveAnatysisofaMediation DosingError Related to CPOE,
12J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS Ass'N 377 (2005).
263. Wears & Berg, supra note 19, at 1262 (references omitted).
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V. POLICY, MARKETS, AND PRAGMATIC INTERVENTION
A. Introduction
Currently the federal government is attempting to goad the healthcare and IT
industries into action with veiled references to carrots and sticks. ONCHIT's Dr.
Brailer is reported to believe that there is a HIT market failure,2 4 and that the
government must do something to prod the industry into action, possibly with
loans or extra Medicare reimbursement, to reward EIHR adoption.265 In the
absence of industry agreement on standards, Brailer is reportedly considering a
government mandate (presumably along the lines of the HIPAA transactional
standards), although he has noted, "Some people think that would be a train
wreck, and some people think that would be a great idea."'  Brailer also stated:
"I don't want to see a Son of HIPAA put into law." 7 Secretary Leavitt coined
the Bush administration's public, non-regulatory mantra-that the movement to
an EIHR should be "a smooth, market-led way,"M while Dr. Brailer's public
position is that the federal government should act as a "convener" and
"tcatalyst." '269
There remain, however, significant barriers to EHR adoption occurring
without government mandate. According to Ash and Bates, these are technical,
organizational (or cultural), and financial. The technical barriers they identify
primarily rotate around the well-known issue of interoperability. Organizational
barriers include appropriate inclusion of all clinical stakeholders (not just
administrators), and the tailoring of technology to physician workflow and time
constraints. They identify the primary financial barrier as a "misalignment of
resources" facing outpatient practices that cannot recoup investments in new
systems.
264. Wears & Berg, supra note 19, at 1262.
265. Lohr, supra note 27.
266. Id.
267. Chris Murphy & Marianne Kolbasuk McGee, Industry Must Improve Its Technology Use,
INFO. WK., June 21, 2004, at 30.
268. HHS, News Release, Secretary Leavitt Takes News Steps to Advance Health IT June
6,2005), http://www.os.dhhs.gov/news/press/2005pres/20050606.html.
269. Dr. David T. Brailer, National Coordinator, Health Information Technology, Testimony
Before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation Subcommittee on Technology,
Innovation, and Competitiveness, U.S. Senate (une 30, 2005), availabk at
http://commerce.senate.gov/pdf/bailer.pdf.
270. Factors and Foces, supra note 89, at 9-10.
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B. Costs and Benefits
Speculatively, a fully operative, national EHR system could reduce the nation's
healthcare bill by ten percent, or 1.7 trillion per year.271 Former HHS Secretary
Thompson suggested in July 2004 that health information technology could save
$140 billion per year "by reducing duplicative care, lowering health care
administration costs, and avoiding errors in care,' 2 72 while Walker et al. estimated
that a fully interoperable EHR could save $77.8 billion annually. 3 In February
2005 the General Accounting Office ("GAO") examined two annual savings
estimates widely cited by the Administration ($78 billion from adopting EHRs,
$44 billion from adopting CPOEs; both in ambulatory settings). GAO concluded
that while "the potential for substantial savings is promising", these estimates
were "primarily based on studies with methodological limitations and are
contingent on much higher IT adoption rates than are currently estimated[.] 27 4
As is always the case with healthcare expenditures, the actual picture is
somewhat more nuanced. First, there are persistent problems with the actuality
or timing of substitution of old practices with new technologies. As Chairman
Greenspan noted in 2004:
[W] e know very little about how rapidly medical technology will continue
to advance and how those innovations will translate into future spending.
To be sure, technological innovations can greatly improve the quality of
medical care and can, in theory, reduce the costs of existing treatments.
But because medical technology expands the range of treatment options,
it also has the potential of adding to overall spending--in some cases,
significantly.7"
Almost all public statements about an interoperable EHR system claim
substantial cost savings. Few statements acknowledge, however, that over the
next decade the implementation of a national EIHR system could cost as much
as $300 billion.7 6
271. Lohr, spra note 27.
272. HHS, HHS Fact Sheet - HIT Report At-A-Glance, The Decade of Health Information
Technology: Deivenng Consumer-entric and Information-Rich Health Care (2004), availabk at
http://www.os.dhhs.gov/news/press/2004pres/20040721.html.
273. Jan Walker et al, The Value of Health Care Information Exchange and Intemperabikly, HEALTH
AFF. (2005), availabk at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/ful/hlthaff.w5.10/DC1.
274. Letter from U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, Health and Human Services' Estimate of
Health Care Cost Savings Resulting from the Use of Information Technology 2 (Feb. 16, 2005),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05309r.pdf.
275. Statement of Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System at Hearing Before the House Comm. on the Budget 6-7 (Feb. 25, 2004),
http://www.house.gov/budget/hearings/greenspanstmnt022504.htm.
276. Landro, supra note 85; See also Rainu Kaushal et al., The Costs of a National Health
Information Network, 143 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 165 (2005) (estimating $156 billion in capital
costs over five year period plus $48 billion in annual operating costs).
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C Financial and Regulatoy Intervention Models
Problems of substitution costs and the lack of compelling evidence of positive
healthcare outcomes notwithstanding, healthcare policymakers, regulators, and
commentators appear to view the interoperable longitudinal EHR as an article of
faith in the pilgrimage to safer, more efficient healthcare delivery. Further,
although there is still much work to be done at the level of technical standards,
it is a reasonably safe assumption that these standards will come to fruition and
deliver something like the required level of data coding and interoperability,277
albeit subject to the privacy and error externalities already discussed. These
premises thus beg the question: why are healthcare actors not developing or
requesting their vendors to supply interoperable systems?
1. Correcting Market Failure
As already noted, Dr. Brailer's articulated position is that process-supporting
technologies have not been implemented in a timely fashion and in quantity
because of a market failure in HIT. More specifically, Middleton et al. posit:
In the current marketplace, in the absence of a similar shared and
realizable gain for clinical information exchange, or other recognition of
the value of collaboration, there is no incentive from the individual
provider's perspective for the adoption and use of a common set of
interoperability standards. Viewed from another perspective, by
distributing the costs of poor information exchange and interoperability
far and wide across all participants in the health care delivery system,
each individual entity may be acting rationally from a local perspective,
but no entity perceives the magnitude of the lost value in the aggregate.
This behavior precludes spending by individual providers or purchasers
of HIT for a potential public good dependent upon the cooperation of
other independent entities. When the vendors of HIT do not perceive
their customers stating interoperability as a requirement of their systems,
they act rationally and do not include these features in their products.27
277. Cf Blackford Middleton et al.,Acceleraing U.S. EHRAdophon: How to Get Them From Here,
12J. AM. MED. INFoRMATICSASs'N. 13,17 (2005), avdlabk at http://www.janiia.org/cgi/reprint/
12/1/13.pdf [hereinafter How to Get Ther From Here].
[Miuch more work needs to be done on functional standards for personal
health records that interact with EHR systems, inpatient clinical information
systems, and additional detail and specification regarding critical functional
modules such as provider order entry and clinical decision support.
Id. at 17.
278. How to Get Them From Here, spra note 276, at 14 (reference omitted).
20051
Widener Law Review
There are two fairly obvious "market failures" at work in the health IT space.
First, the interoperable nature of the EHR suggests a fairly classic network effects
(or network externalities) problem. Second, the persistent flaw in the United
States healthcare market, whereby those who pay for services are divorced from
those who consume them, comes into play, resulting in a "misalignment of
incentives." '279
A network effect is "a change in the benefit, or surplus, that an agent derives
from a good when the number of other agents consuming the same kind of good
changes." 2" The classic example in the economics literature is a telephone
service-as the number of users of interoperable telephone equipment increases,
so the value of the service to each increases. In the context of an EHR system
this "synchronization value, 28' or benefit, could have two components. First,
there may be what is called a direct network effect if, for example, a healthcare
provider that pulls EHR data into its EMR system achieves better results (for
example, higher satisfaction of patients) or suffers lower costs (for example, a
reduction in medical errors). Second, there may be indirect positive network
effects if a provider pushes (likely deidentified) data to a central body, resulting
in improvements in outcomes research or the reduction of public health costs.
28 2
Until there is a critical mass of providers interlinking their EMRs, there is little
or no incentive for providers to seek out compatible EMR systems or pay a
premium for an EMR with interoperability features; nor do providers have any
rational interest in combining with others to build or maintain a health
communications infrastructure.' The indirect network effect is even more
fundamental, as it is difficult to see any near-term economic benefit flowing to the
provider who pushes deidentified data to any centralized body.
Even if we project ahead to the EHR tipping point, i.e., when a critical mass
of providers are using interoperable EMR systems, the marginal value of
interoperability may be very small for a very large, integrated provider that has its
own system-wide EMR. Indeed, that marginal value may even be negated by the
privacy and security costs associated with "opening" a closed system to national
interoperability and the "weakest security link" phenomenon already noted.
Similarly, much of medical science, particularly university medical research
centers, values the separation of data because of its economic value, suggesting
a culture of non-sharing that must be addressed.84  For these stakeholders,
279. How to Get There From Here, supra note 276, at 14.
280. S. J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Network Externaies (Effects),
http://wwwpub.utdallas.edu/-liebowit/palgrave/network.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2005).
281. Id.
282. Seegeneral# Stern School, New York University, Network Effects,
http://oz.stem.nyu.edu/io/network.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2005).
283. See David J. Brailer, Interoperabik'y: The Key to the Future Health Care System, HEALTH AFF.
(2005), avadlabkathtts://content.healthaffas.org/cgi/content/ful/hthaff.w5.19/DCI [hereinafter
The Key To The Future Health Ca System].
284. See general# M. L. Baker, Panek CulturalShift Needed to Make Health Data Valuabk, EWEEK,
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opening up their internal systems to interoperability also creates a counter-
weighing negative externality. Thakor developed a similar hypothesis regarding
the financial services sector, further parallels to which are further discussed below,
whereby he suggested banks had generally not outsourced their IT or developed
interoperable systems because of a belief that maintaining proprietary systems
would preserve future strategic options coupled with a desire to exercise control
over the sector's IT evolution.'
s
The second major identified failure involves the positive externalities generated
when those who invest in new technologies do not receive a satisfactory return
on investment. Thus, in the context of healthcare services financing and
reimbursement in the United States, it is argued that providers lack incentives to
pay for EHR technology, because most of the benefit will accrue to payors.3 In
the future, reimbursement will be more frequently tied to quality or outcomes
improvement under "Pay For Performance" ("P4P") programs, potentially giving
providers meaningful returns on their HIT investments.' However, P4P is still
in its infancy,88 and will require additional "pushes" by Congress, such as those
found in the Health Technology to Enhance Qualioy Act of 2 0 0 5 .
Ash and Bates make the valuable point that this misaligned incentives problem
is exaggerated in the outpatient environment. For example, they argue that while
hospitals may recover investments they make in process supporting technologies,
the same is not true for outpatient practices, where physicians will make the
investment but payers and purchasers will reap almost all of the return on
investment.' This problem of misaligned resources is not just a theoretical
Feb. 19, 2005, availabk at http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1759,1767127,00.asp.
285. Anjan V. Thakor, Information Technology and Financial Services Consolidation, 23J. BANKING
FIN. 697 (1999).
286. How to Get There From Here, supra note 277, at 14.
287. Id.
288. See, e.g., Press Release, CMS, Medicare "Pay For Performance (P4P)" Initiatives (an. 31,
2005), available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/media/press/release.asp?Counter=1343). See generalt
David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, The Poor State of Health Care.Quakty In The U.S.: Is Maoractice
Liabikly Part of The Probkm or Part of The Solution?, 90 CoRNELL L REv. 893, 963-969 (2005).
289. Health Technology to Enhance Quality Act of 2005, S. 1262, 109th Cong. § 301 (2005).
290. Factors and Forces, supra note 89, at 9-11. See also How to Get There From Here, supra note 277,
at 14:
[M]any of the patient safety and quality effects of EHRs accrue benefit to the
payer or employer-purchaser of health care services who is at greater risk for
a patient's total health care costs given decreasing rates of provider
reimbursement under capitation. Under fee-for-service reimbursement
models, providers have little incentive to use EHRs unless they can contribute
enough to practice efficiency or revenue cycle management to improve net
revenue per time unit. Under mixed reimbursement models such as variable
withholds, and newer pay-for-performance programs, EHRs may contribute
to achieving performance or quality benchmarks that warrant increased
reimbursement or increased return of withhold payments.
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concern. For example, the Community Health Improvement Consortium
("CHIC') of Whatcom County, Washington instituted a pilot e-health system
requiring interoperable EMRs and a patient-centric model of care using a web
resource and email communication between patients and providers."9 Hailed as
a success by both physician and patient participants as improving quality and
reducing overall healthcare costs, the system has not been as popular with
physician groups who have seen their income reduced and an inability to recoup
their HIT investments.92 An additional consideration is that there is cogent
evidence that hospitals with declining margins are more likely to exhibit increased
adverse events," suggesting that those institutions most in need of process-
supporting technologies are the least able to finance them.
Applying similar economic models to CPOE/CDSS and track-and-trace
technologies reinforces these observations on market failure in EHR provision.
Why is this former set of technologies experiencing explosive growth, yet with
only minimal (and immature) federal regulatory intervention? First, and most
obviously, CPOE/CDSS do not typically require interoperability with other
systems and they use standardized platforms such as Microsoft's
Mobile/PocketPC operating system (which has a dominant position in
enterprises).294 Second, investment in CPOEs and track-and-trace (and to a lesser
extent, CDSS) technologies promises a relatively quick return on investment by
reducing medical error low-hanging fruit (such as transcription errors) and
reducing losses with tighter inventory and diversion control. Third, the legal
system creates incentives for CPOE adoption because: (1) plaintiffs' malpractice
attorneys are already able to leverage positive reports in the medical literature and
the well-publicized Leapfrog CPOE Standards,2 s (2) at least one state mandates
291. Institute for Healthcare Improvement, Pursuing Perfiction. Rportfrm Whatom County,
Wlashington on Patient-Centered Care, http://wwwdhi.org/IHI/Topics/PatientCenteredCare
PatientCenteredCareGeneral/ImprovementStories/PursuingPerfectionReportfromWhatcom
CountyWashingtononPatientCenteredCare.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2005).
292. Gina Kolata, Health Plan That Cuts Costs Raises Doctors' Ir, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 11, 2004, at
Al.
293. William E. Encinosa & Didem M. Bernard, Hospital Finances and Patient Safety Outcomes,
42 INQUIRY 60, 60-63 (2005).
294. Seegeneral4 Microsoft Windows Mobile, For Business, http://www.microsoft.com/
windowsmobile/business/default.mspx (last visited Oct. 31, 2005).
295. See The Leapfrog Group, Factsheet: Computer PLysidan Order Entty, Apr. 18 2004,
http://www.leapfroggroup.org/media/file/Leapfrog-ComputerPhysicoanOrderEntry-Fact
_Sheet.pdf.
In order to fully meet Leapfrog's CPOE Standard, hospitals must:
1. Assure that physicians enter at least .75% of medication orders via a
computer system that includes prescribing-error prevention software;
2. Demonstrate that their inpatient CPOE system can alert physicians of at
least 50/ of common, serious prescribing errors, using a testing protocol..;
and
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CPOE adoption,2 and (3) the FDA is already in the track-and-trace
"business.""7 Finally, in the admittedly limited arena of CPOE adoption, third
party payors have been swift to recognize their own interests (improved patient
satisfaction and reduced errors) and are either donating handheld devices to large
numbers of doctors"s or rewarding their utilization.'
. As to EMRs, the market will promote some increases in interoperability when
an inevitable consolidation of HIT vendors reduces the number of competing
systems, thereby creating some interoperability as more providers use the same
system.' However, he current market conditions are considerably more
complicated than the classic VHS-Beta competition and a "last vendor standing"
solution is not likely to appear in the short term (and certainly not within
President Bush's target "decade"). °  As a result, most commentators and
3. Require that physicians electronically document a reason for overriding an
interception prior to doing so.
Id. at 2.
296. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1339.63 (West 2005).
297. Bar Code Label Requirement for Human Drug Products and Biological Products, 69
Fed. Reg. 9120 (Feb. 26, 2004); U.S. Food and Drug Admin., supra note 232.
298. See, e.g., News Release, Blue Cross Blue Shield of Missouri, New BCBSMO Initiative
Jumpstarts Physician Participation in the Electronic Medical Community (an.16, 2004), availabk
at http://www.bcbsmo.com/wps/portal/chpfooter?PC 7_2_CQ-contentcpath=shield/
noapplication/glabal/news/notertiary/pw-ad33663.htm&RootLevel=&Labe=News%20And
%20Events (1,700 contracting physicians in Missouri supplied with free handhelds and software).
299. See, e.g., Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield, 37 Hospitah Recive Combined Total of$ 741,200 in
Three- YearPatent Safe* Initiative, May 19, 2005, avalhbk at http: //www.empireblue.com / home / press
_release/2005/0519_2005.php (bonuses paid to network hospitals complying that met Leapfrog
standard for CPOE and/or ICU staffing).
300. See, e.g., Steve Lohr, LB.M. Plans to Buy a Health Consuting Firm, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26,
2005, at C3. See alo, Philips to Buy Health-Care Tech Firm, WALL ST. J., July 7, 2005, at B5 (detailing
purchase by Philips Electronics NV of U.S. health-care technology company Stentor Inc. for $280
million aimed at strengthening Philips's position in the U.S. HIT market).
301. Dr. Brailer has framed the issue as follows:
A central question about interoperability is how it should proceed relative to
EMR adoption. Some argue that interoperability has to precede EMR use.
They believe that the ability to share information has to be designed into
EMRs and that the infrastructure and industry capacity for securely
networking this information has to exist up front. They view the risk of
widespread adoption of stand-alone EMRs as a lost opportunity and one that
may lead irreversibly to treatment of health information as a proprietary asset
of delivery systems. They believe that if standards are not solidified and built
into EMRs now, a generation of investment will be wasted. Others argue that
interoperability will follow from widespread EMR adoption. They believe that
once health information is electronic and everyone is using EMRs,
interoperability will naturally follow, since it is easier and cheaper than manual
data sharing. They view up-front requirements for interoperability as too
restrictive and think that standards will naturally evolve from the point-of-care
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architects suggest financial incentives of various types, including the availability
of government loans or grants to fund hardware and software purchases, and
tying reimbursement directly to HIT adoption or indirectly through quality
benchmarks.
30 2
A study by the Markle Foundation failed to identify a rational business case for
the adoption of HIT systems by providers and identified the need for financial
incentives for small and medium sized practices in the range $12,000 - $24,000
per full time physician per year, phasing out over time as they were replaced by
performance-based incentives. 3 As Middleton et al. note:
While a great deal of work has been done demonstrating the impact of
clinical information systems on clinical decision making and the quality
of care, little work has been done that demonstrates the impact of health
care information technology on economic outcomes. . . . [T]here is
limited solid evidence demonstrating significantly improved financial
outcomes resulting from HIT investments.' °
In a recent development, CMS has announced that it will provide the VA's
VistA system free of charge to all doctors,35 although the details of the plan
(particularly the technical and support costs) are not yet known.3 6 In September
2005, and after several delays, CMS released an evaluation version of the software,
re-designed for doctors' offices, for beta testing and development."7
The EHIR "market failure" discourse has concentrated on the HIT market.
However, there has been little discussion of the possible impact of IT
implementation on the overall healthcare market. Frequently, healthcare is
unfavorably compared to the financial services market, primarily because of its
comparatively low investment in IT. However, the financial services sector is also
an interesting model because of the rapid consolidation it has experienced;
consolidation frequently driven by information technologies. Low margin
businesses (such as financial and healthcare institutions) that offer commodity
products and services require massive scale to continually update their
technologies so they can offer new services and a large customer base that they
can data mine for marketing purposes; only the largest institutions can afford the
information infrastructure that the United States is building.
The Kqy To The Future Health Care System, supra note 283.
302. How to Get Them From Here, supra note 277, at 15-16.
303. Press Release, Markle Foundation, Connecting For Health Report Analyzes Business
Case For Adoption of Health IT Systems (Oct. 22, 2004), http://wwwconnectingforhealth.org
/news/pressrelease_102204.html.
304. How to Get There From Here, supra note 277, at 13.
305. Gina Kolata, In Unexpected Medicare Benefit U.S. Will Offer Doctors Free Ekctronic Records
System, N.Y. TIMEs, July 21, 2005 at A14.
306. Id
307. Press Release, Medicare News, CMS Delivers Electronic Health Record Software to
Physician Offices, Sept. 19, 2005, availabk at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/media/press/release.asp?
Counter=1 563. See also Vista-Office EHR, http://www.vista-office.org (last visited Nov. 9,2005).
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state-of-the-art technology required. Consolidation occurs in part when
financial services institutions invested heavily in IT can leverage their IT
investment and expertise to extract value from financial institutions with lesser
technologies or expertise.'
Dr. Brailer recently testified before Congress, "the gap in EHR adoption
between large hospitals and small hospitals, between large and small physician
practices, and between other healthcare providers must be addressed. This
adoption gap has the potential to shift the market in favor of large players who
can afford these technologies, and can create differential health treatments and
quality, resulting in a quality gap.,31 0 A 2005 survey by Hospitals & Health
Networks suggests that an IT vector already exists between "Most Wired" and
"Least Wired hospitals.3 ' For example, in forty-one percent of the most-wired
hospitals physicians use CPOEs, compared to only eight percent in the least-
wired group (and twenty-seven percent of hospitals nationally).3"2 Similar vectors
appear in CDSS use (sixty-five percent vs. nineteen percent)" 3 and electronic
ordering of medications (tweny-eight percent vs. two percent).3 4
However, a "quality gap" could be only one symptom of differential leveraging
of HIT; consolidation and driving out of small players may be as likely
consequences. Take, for example, the 2005 acquisition of PacifiCare by
UnitedHealth for $8.14 billion, a move driven by the change in prescription
markets driven by the prescription drug benefit in the Medicare Prescription Drug,
Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 ("MMA").31 s If large systems or plans
invest heavily in process-supporting technologies, those who do not may be
candidates for acquisition. Equally, smaller hospitals or groups that cannot invest
in the new technologies may find themselves shut out of relationships with wired
providers. As is well known, there has been considerable consolidation of the
healthcare industry over the past decade through mergers and, particularly,
through hospitals joining systems.316 Cuellar and Gertler have argued that the
quest for efficiencies of scale and leveraging of information systems were less
important in driving this activity but concluded "hospital consolidation is likely
308. Seegeneral/j Steven Marlin, Information Technology Spurs Consolidation In FinandalSeices While
Boosting Capaiy, Say, G-1O Report, BANK SYSTEMS & TECHNOLOGY, May 1, 2001, available at
http://static.highbeam.com/b/banksystemstechnology/mayOl200l/informationtech.
309. See, e.g., Thakor, supra note 285, at 697-700.
310. Dr. David J. Brailer, supra note 269, at 6-7.
311. Health & Hospital Networks, supra note 245.
312. Id. at Figure 1.
313. Id.
314. Id. at Figure 3.
315. UnitedHealth toAcquire PadfiCarefor$8.14 Bilkon, CHICAGOTRiBUNE,July 7, 2005, available
at http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/chi-0507070173ju107,1,587225.story?coU=chi-
business-hed.
316. Alison Evans Cuellar & Paul D. Gertler, How The Expansion Of Hospital Systems Has
Affected Consumers, 24 HEALTH AFF. 213, 215-217 (2005).
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a response to managed care in urban areas, particularly among for-profit
hospitals" '3 17 Worryingly, they report: "Our results show that following
consolidation, hospital market power, not the efficiency of care delivery,
increased; and hospitals gained higher prices but did not translate them into
higher quality of inpatient care or the provision of more community goods.
' 318
Several bills introduced in the last two sessions of Congress have sought to
provide incentives to HIT and accelerate the development of data
interoperability.319 For example, The Health Information Technology Act of 2005320
would create a competitive "Informatics Systems Grant Program" ($4.05 billion
over five years) for most health care providers of up to, for example, $1 million
for a critical access hospital or $15,000 for a physician.32 The proposed
legislation would also adjust federal tax law to allow current year deductions of
(otherwise capital) informatics expenditures.3 2
The Health Technology to Enhance ,Quality Act of 2005 perhaps best suggests
Congress' current, bipartisan thinking on how to encourage the adoption of HIT.
Co-sponsors, Senators Frist and Clinton, introduced the bill with a statement that
it was designed to "encourage creation of an interoperable health IT architecture
that fundamentally improves the quality of healthcare, reduces costs and reduces
barriers to the adoption of interoperable health IT across all healthcare
settings."'  The bill authorizes five years of $125 million annual matching grants
to create local or regional health information plans that promote health
information interoperability.324 Such grants are conditioned on, inter alia, the use
of the federal standards, privacy standards, and a broad inclusion of stakeholders.
A. Regulation
As described above, in the face of market failure caused by network
externalities, a network "owner" can reduce the failure by internalizing some of
the network externalities. In the case of the EHR, for example, the federal
317. Cuellar & Gertler, supra note 316, at 215-217.
318. Id. at 217.
319. See, e.g., Information Technology for Health Care Quality Act, S. 2907, 108th Cong.
(2004); Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act, H.R. 663; 108th Cong. (2003); Patient Safety
Improvement Act of 2003, H.R. 877, 108th Cong. (2003); 21st Century Health Information Act
of 2005, H.R. 2234, 109th Cong. (2005); Better Healthcare through Information Technology Act,
S. 1355, 109th Cong. (2005).
320. Health Information Technology Act of 2005, S. 1227, 109th Cong. (2005).
321. S. 1227, § 2(e)(2)(A)(h).
322. S. 1227, § 5.
323. Caroline Broder, Frist, Clinton to Introduce Healtbeam JTBiII HEALTHCARE IT NEWS, June
14, 2005. See also Press Release, Fnist, Clinton Introduce Health Technology To Enhance Quality
Act of 2005 (June 16, 2005), availabk at http://frist.senate.gov/index.cfin?FuseAction=Press
Releases.Detail&PressRelease_id=1961&Month=6&Year=2005.
324. Health Technology to Enhance Quality Act of 2005, S. 1262, 109th Cong. § 201 (2005).
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government could internalize the cost of the network infrastructure by building
and maintaining it. Similarly, a less obvious "owner," a standards authority such
as HL7, may internalize some of the interoperability costs by developing and
promulgating messaging standards. The more difficult question, however, is the
extent to which government should go beyond cost internalization and drive
standards adoption, either directly through regulation of the healthcare industry,
or indirectly by dominating or regulating other "owners" such as standards
authorities.
A lingering question concerns the core competence of the federal government
to create fully functioning, interoperable systems. For example, the Department
of Defense's CHCS II medical records system has had problems interoperating
with the VA's VistA system,32 while the IT bioterrorism surveillance systems of
the CDC and the Homeland Security Department are years away from
interoperable implementation.3 26 Not surprisingly, direct federal regulation of
patient safety information remains a subject for which few stakeholders seem to
show enthusiasm;32 NCVHS has stayed away from the topic, preferring that the
federal government lead by example and as an influential payor.328 The IOM has
seemed closer to accepting that federal regulatory intervention will be required to
set data standards.3' Clearly, the Bush Administration sees regulatory
intervention as a last resort (and, possibly, as a tacit admission that its construct
has failed).
The reality, of course, is that healthcare is our most regulated industry. It is a
domain in which immense public value, intrinsic market failures, and the potential
for both financial and physical harms leads to increased regulation on an almost
daily basis. Vast areas of health law and regulation continue to reside in our state
capitols and, as the federal government continues to offload its financial
responsibilities for healthcare to the states, this will only increase.
Only a few examples are needed to demonstrate the pro-regulatory world of
modem healthcare and, specifically, HIT. HIPAA is one obvious illustration, but
a more recent Bush Administration program is even more telling. The relatively
modest electronic prescribing model introduced by the MMA required the
establishment of a "Commission on Systemic Interoperability, ' '33° amendments
325. See general# Letter from Linda D. Koontz, Director, Info. Mgmt. Issues, to Steve Buyer,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Veterans' Affairs, House
of Representatives (May 14,2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/news.items/d04691R.pdf.
326. Mary Mosquera, CDC, DHS Years Awayfiro Biotemr, Pubic Health IT Integraion, Govr
COMPUTER NEWS, July 11, 2005, availabk at
http://www.gcn.com/vollnol /daily-updates/36343-1.html.
327. For example, Leape and Berwick pay some regard to regulation (albeit through JCAHO
accreditation) and changes in reimbursement, but overall favor payment incentives and
disincentives. Leape & Berwick, rupra note 11, at 2389.
328. Letter from John Lumpkin, supra note 103, at 2-3.
329. KEY CAPABILrIES OF AN ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORD SYSTEM, supra note 79.
330. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA),
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to fraud and abuse laws, 331 and regulatory authority to issue electronic prescribing
standards. 3 2  In early 2005, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services
("CMS") issued proposed standards for e-prescribing pursuant to the MMA. 3
Although there is no requirement of e-prescribing, if it is used the trading
partners must comply with the standards outlined by CMS, specifically the
National Council for Prescription Drug Programs SCRIPT Standard (for
messaging) and X12N and NCPDP (for eligibility communications).3 4
The recent barrage of proposed federal legislation also suggests that the
government will be unable to eschew all regulation of patient safety information.
For example, the Patient Safey Improvement Act of 2003 would have required the
federal government to establish standards for outcome reporting,33 and the
Patient Safety and Quaity Improvement Act of 2004 would have promoted and
regulated voluntary error reporting of non-identifiable patient safety data by
"Patient Safety Organizations," instructed HHS to maintain a national patient
safety network of databases, and required the same agency to develop or adopt
voluntary standards for interoperability of health information.3
In the current term, the proposed Health Information Technology Act of 2005
would provide federal grants to healthcare providers to aid in the purchase or
lease of health informatics hardware and software. Such grants would be
conditioned on compliance with the "voluntary" standards on interoperability
337
that the same bill tasks the Secretary to develop within two years.338 Between
2008 and 2010, such standards would be adopted by DHHS as an "optional"
method of receiving reporting data.339 The Health Technology to Enhance Quality Act
of 2005 would establish a permanent "Standards Working Group"' that
essentially will take over the Consolidated Health Informatics Initiative.34 The
standards thereafter adopted by HHS 3 2 would be "voluntary for private
Pub. L. No. 108-173, 51012, 117 Stat. 2066, 2435 (2003).
331. 117 Stat. at % 301-307.
332. 117 Stat. at 5108.
333. Medicare Program, E-Prescribing and the Prescription Drug Program, 70 Fed. Reg. 6256
(Feb. 4, 2005) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 423).
334. Medicare Program, E-Prescribing and the Prescription Drug Program, 70 Fed. Reg. at
6265.
335. Patient Safety Improvement Act of 2003, H. R. 877, 108th Cong. (2003).
336. Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act, H. R. 663; 108th Cong. (2003).
337. Health Information Technology Act of 2005, S. 1227, 109th Cong. § 2(o (2005).
338. S. 1227 § 4.
339. S. 1227 § 4(b).
340. Health Technology to Enhance Quality Act of 2005, S. 1262, 109th Cong. § 2903(a)
(2005).
341. S. 1262 § 2903(c).
342. S. 1262 § 2903(e).
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entities" 3 but mandatory for the federal government.' HHS also would
coordinate a certification or accreditation program for hardware, software, and
support claiming to comply with the standards. 4
Even the Frist-Clinton Health Technology to Enhance Qualiy Act, which is the
most wired in to current administrative thinking on patient safety information,
would (1) require study of the issues and providing grants to cooperative ventures
between states,"' (2) apply HIPAA's privacy, confidentiality, and security
provisions to "any health information stored or transmitted in an electronic
format," 7 and (3) amend the Medicare anti-kickback statute' and the Stark law
prohibition on self-referral 9 to permit payments or support designed to promote
the exchange of health information, 310 while requiring HHS to establish a safe
harbor for group purchasing of health information technology."' As of this
writing, the sponsors of the various bills, prompted by encouragement from the
Senate Finance and Health Education, Labor, and Pensions Committees have
proposed a single compromise bill, to be known as the Wiredfor Health Care
Qualiy Act.
352
State law examples of patient safety information regulation are legion. For313
example, California will require acute care hospitals to use CPOEs by 2005, and
several states are requiring prescription legibility3 4 that inevitably will increase
pressure to adopt IT solutions. Further, several states have dramatically increased
the reach and complexity of their error and adverse event reporting
requirements,355 with Minnesota's Adverse Health Care Events ReportingAct of2oo3
356
increasingly being viewed as a model for other states.357
California was the first state legislature to consider legislation limiting RFID
use because of privacy concerns. Senate Bill 183438 would have restricted data
collection using RFID to the actual point of sale, thus prohibiting, for example,
data collection as the customer browsed through products, or after the customer
343. S. 1262 § 2903(0.
344. S. 1262 §§ 2903(e), 2905(b)(1).
345. S. 1262 § 2904(b).
346. S. 1262 §§ 102, 2906.
347. S. 1262 § 2907(1).
348. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b) (2001).
349. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (2001).
350. S. 1262 § 202.
351. S. 1262 § 203.
352. Wired for Healthcare Quality Act, S. 1418, 109th Cong. (2005).
353. CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1339.63 (West 2005).
354. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 456.42 (West 2005).
355. See, e.g., Hospital Report Card Act, 210 ILL. CoMP. STAT. 86/25 (West 2005).
356. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§144.706-144.7069 (2003).
357. Angela Galloway, Hospital-Error Overight Caled Lax, SEATrLE POST-INTELLIGENCER,
May 5, 2005, at Al.
358. S.B. 1834, 2003-04 Sess. (Cal. 2004).
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left the store. The bill passed the state Senate, but subsequently was killed by an
Assembly committee after objections by business interests. 319 Legislatures in
Georgia, Massachusetts, Maryland, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Mexico,
Rhode Island, and Utah are either studying the issue, or dealing with bills that
contain similar limitations as the California bill, or require disclosure of the
existence of a wireless tag or tracking technologies.'
HIMSS tracked ninety-eight state bills considered in thirty-seven state
legislatures in the first half of 2005.361 Overall, it seems difficult to imagine that
comprehensive federal patient safety information regulation can be avoided. At
the very least, diverse state privacy, quality, and patient safety laws will require
federal harmonization and, assuming a successful market-led introduction of
EIHR, some corrective mechanisms to deal with consolidation of the healthcare
market and the financing implications seem inevitable.
VI. PATIENT-CENTRICITY: CAN PRAGMATISM ACCOMMODATE AUTONOMY?
The prevailing view espoused by this country's policymakers and regulators is
that patient information (be it transactional or safety related) is to be protected by
security and confidentiality. Security keeps out the hackers, and confidentiality
(mislabeled by HIPAA as "privacy") keeps the data within the circle of care, thus
denying its leveraging for secondary uses such as marketing or patient profiling.
This model is as flawed as it is persistent. What is missing from the picture is
real patientprivag, an autonomy-based conception that, first, patient information
is patient "property" and, second, it is patients who must decide what information
should be put into the system, and how and by whom it should be used once it
resides there. It may be too late to revisit HIPAA and transactional information;
the challenge today is to reftame the patient safety information debate with a
patient-centric approach.
These concerns are not the sole province of privacy advocates such as the
Electronic Frontier Foundation,36 2 but are now more frequently reflected by
public opinion. According to a 2005 poll by Harris Interactive, seventy-one
percent of respondents knew nothing about the government's HIT plans.
363
When asked to weigh the benefits of an EHR system against its privacy risks,
359. Claire Swedberg, Cak'rnia RFID Legislation Rejected, RFIDJoURNAL, July 5,2004, availabk
at http://www.rfidjoumal.com/article/aricleview/1015/1/1/.
360. SeeRETAIL.INDUSTRYLEADERSAssOCIATION, 2005 RFID LEGISLATION (2005), availabk
athttp://www.retal-leaders.org/new/resources/RFID%2Bil%2Summaries%202005%2006-06-
05.pdf.
361. Press Release, Healthcare Info. and Mgmt. Sys. Soc'y, All Healthcare IT Legislation Is
Local: HIMSS Reviews State Public Policy Focused on Improving Care with Technology (July 14,
2005), available at http://www.himss.org/ASP/ContentRedirector.asp?ContentlD=65096.
362. See, e.g., Electronic Frontier Foundation, Privacy, Security, Crypto & Surveillance,
http://www.eff.org/Privacy (last visited Oct. 9, 2005).
363. Harris Interactive, supra note 252, at table 4.
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respondents were equally divided.364 Further, forty-two percent of respondents
were "very concerned" (and another twenty-seven percent "somewhat
concerned") that an EHR system would lead to additional sharing of information
without the patient's knowledge." s
These issues are not unique to the United States. For example, the United
Kingdom, which since 2003 has been working on a national EHR project (NHS
Care Records Service) as a component of its National Programme for IT in the NHS,366
ran into some serious criticisms and apprehension from providers and patients
alike over privacy and security issues.36' The NHS has published an EHR bill of
rights called The Care Record Guarantee explaining, for example, the rights of
patients to opt out of the system'" or electronically seal their most sensitive
information.36  Yet, such autonomy is calling into question the value of the
overall system plan and the efficacy of treatment given to patients who opt out.
Equally, the Australian HealthConnect system, which enjoyed considerable
benefits by front-end loading its concept and model with pro-autonomy and pro-
privacy principles, has experienced a patient-privacy backlash.370 As HealthConnect
has completed its initial trials, it has run into considerable funding and provider
participation problems and has continued to raise fundamental questions as to
patient privacy and consent.371' As Commonwealth (federal) funding has slowed,
HealthConnect is in the process of evolving into a more decentralized and less
EHR-centric project that emphasizes point-to-point clinical communication and
web-based access to health and health plan information for patients.372
The Australian experience suggests that both patients and physicians preferred
simple consent models such as a generalized "opt-in" and prospective consent for
364. Harris Interactive, supra note 252, at table 5.
365. Id. at table 5 (Expected benefits outweigh risks to privacy; forty-eight percent. Privacy
risks outweigh the expected benefits; forty-seven percent). Id. at table 6.
366. National Programme for IT in the NHS, http://www.connectingforhealth.nhs.uk (last
visited Nov. 9, 2005).
367. GPs Fret Over Onkne Records, TIMES (London), June 7, 2005, at 6; Sam Lister, How £ 6bn
Computer System Will He4 Heal the NHS, TIMES (London), Aug. 9, 2004, at 4; Alice Miles, The Spy
in the GP's Suery, TIMES (London),Jan. 12,2005, at 18; Nick Triggle, Confidentiali Fear OverRecords,
BBC NEWS, June 29,2005, availabk at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/4633213.stm.
368. NHS, The Care Record Guarantee: Our Guarantee for NHS Care Records in England,
http://www.connectingforhealth.nhs.uk/al images anddocs/CRS/ 20GUARANTEE/20L
EAFLET/o20%28FINAL%29.pdf (last visited Feb. 9, 2006).
369. John Carvel, Patients Can Stay OffNHS Database, GUARDIAN, Jan. 14, 2005, at 11.
370. Terry, supra note 77, at 33.
371. Karen Dearne, Feds'Health Data Project Stalls, AUSTRALIAN, June 7, 2005, at 29.
372. Seegeneral4 HealthConnect, HealthConnect Impknentation Strate Version 2.1,July 6,2005,
available at http://www.healthconnect.gov.au/pdf/implementation.pdf. For the most recent
version of the Australian EIHR model see NEHTA, Towards an Interoperabily Framework" Version 1.8,




the pushing of their data to the centralized HealthConnect summary record.
However, many patients remain uncomfortable with any participation in the
system, while providers doubt its efficacy without broad patient participation.3"
Ironically, the huge difficulty in implementing a true EIHR in the United States
may have the effect of perpetuating siloed information, and thereby
unintentionally protecting patient privacy and autonomy. For example, system
architects continue to be challenged by the question of how the myriad of
different healthcare participants should be identified for the purposes of
transactional and patient safety networks. Eventually, HIPAA regulations should
take care of most of the provider and payor issues through the proposed
Identifier Standards.37 4 However, any single, social security-like personal health
identifier that specifically identifies patients now seems increasingly unlikely.375
Rather, we should expect far more decentralized, less top-down solutions for
identifying specific patients so as to link their records. For example, the Markle
Foundation has proposed using record locator (pointer) services or indexes to
indicate the location of patient records, or what is known as probabilistic
matching based on web search engine technologies that can be used by the
current provider to identify prior records pertaining to the patient. 7 6 Using such
approaches necessitates a far less centralized concept of record-keeping and
availability. However, it is likely to involve its own error (mistakes in matching)
and privacy (a necessity that multiple machine identified records be viewed to
confirm the correct match) costs.
There are several (not mutually inconsistent) models (most of which will
require regulatory intervention) to make patient safety information systems more
responsive to patient interests. First, we could adopt a fully autonomy-privacy
based model, whereby patients can refuse to allow for certain types of patient
safety information acquisition (e.g., RFID tracking) or the inclusion of all of
certain types of data (e.g., psychotherapy records) in an interoperable system.
Second, a HealthConnect type model could be adopted, whereby the patient (in
consultation with the relevant physician) determines what summary or excerpted
information, if any, is pushed to a centralized record.
Third, an EIHR model could be built that collects (or interconnects) all patient
data; but patients and providers determine who can access what information and
373. HealthConnect, les.rsonsLeamedf rom the MediConnet Field Test andHealthConneat Tials, Apr.
2005, at 8, availabk at http://www.healthconnect.gov.au/pdf/lessonsl-10.pdf.
374. See, e.g., Notice of Proposed Ruk Making for the Nadonal Standard Health Can Proider Identifier,
http://aspe.hhs.gov/admnsirnp/nprm/npilist.htm; Health Insurance Reform: Standard Unique
Employer Identifier, 67 Fed. Reg. 38009 (May 31, 2002) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts 160 and
162).
375. Nancy Ferris, Hopefor Patient ID Dwindles, Gov'T HEALTH IT, July 11, 2005, availabk at
http://www.govhealthit.com/article89517-07-11-05-Web.
376. Markle Foundation, Linking Health Care Information: Proposed Methodsformproving Care and
Protecting Privaj (2005), http://www.connecdngforhealth.org/assets/reports/linking-report_2_
2005.pdf.
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for what purposes. Thus, Baker has argued that the prevailing security-centric
model for protecting patient information (that she describes as based on
authentication, access rules, allowing or denying access, and audit 3 ) could be
improved upon with a Digital Rights Management ("DRM")37 8 style metadata
model, whereby the data object (here the patient record) is infused with
restrictions on how much of it can be viewed, copied, etc., by any authorized user
or class of users." 9 Fourth, and presuming a full-collection EIHR, we could
adopt an access-and-edit model, whereby the patient can review the longitudinal




Few healthcare stakeholders, the shining exception beingJCAHO, 38' accept that
patient safety and error-compensation must progress hand-in-hand. Without a
broad national consensus on solving our fundamental healthcare quality
problems, we will see, at most, only narrow-band reforms. Our policymakers feel
boxed in-safety regulation is politically unacceptable because of the country's
deep divide over malpractice litigation, while market-based approaches to quality
improvement, such as P4P, are at the earliest stages of development. Faced with
ever-escalating healthcare costs, the pragmatic solution has been to sidestep the
problem by concentrating on technological solutions-which is not a bad thing;
HIT is astoundingly powerful and may achieve many of their goals in the long
term.
However, the currently articulated HIT models are blinkered by their starting
premise that we can only solve the problem with technology at the institutional
level, and they sometimes seem unaware of the Orwellian possibilities of their
patient safety information construct. There is little doubt that an EIHR fed by
377. Dixie B. Baker, Ph.D., Sci. Applications Int'l Corp., Healthcare Info. and Mgmt. Sys.
Soc'y, Testimony Prepared for National Committee on Vital and Health Statistics Subcommittee
on Privacy and Confidentiality 2 (an.12, 2005), availabk at http://www.himss.org/content/files/
BakerTestimonyFINAL_.pdf.
378. Digital Rights Management (DRM) is an umbrella term referring to any of several
technical methods used to control or restrict the use of digital media content on electronic devices
with such technologies installed. Wikipedia, Digital Rights Management, http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/DigitaLrightsmanagement (last visited Oct. 31, 2005).
379. Baker, supra note 377, at 2-3.
380. For additional suggestions for EIHR privacy models or regulation, see Nicolas P. Terry,
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at http://www.ncvhs.hhs.gov/050816pl.pdf.
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technologies such as EMRs, RFID, and CPOE/CDSS technologies will be an
unparalleled source of population-based data for health researchers, a potent
weapon in the fight against bioterrorism, and a major component in the battle
against escalating healthcare costs and unacceptable levels of medical error. But,
unless patients and doctors trust HIT systems to respect their privacy and to not
introduce additional errors, attempts to overhaul our patient safety information
systems will be a failure; doctors will reduce their charting and patients will hide
even more information from their doctors.
Federal policymakers and regulators are beginning to recognize that patients
and providers must become more closely involved in the EIHR process. Indeed,
in a recent speech, Dr. Brailer, who is a true HIT visionary,' expressed his desire
to be attentive to patient interests with the phrase: "This is not insider
baseball. '383 Extending that metaphor, AHRQ Director, Dr. Carolyn Clancy,
recently testified before Congress, "[u]nlike the baseball field in the movie Field
of Dreams, we have dramatic examples of the building of health IT systems,
whose designers found physicians and other clinicians neither came nor
played. ' 38  The likely strategy of the "insiders" is to wait until they have
successful regional demonstration projects that suggest compelling cost savings
and safety improvements, yet exhibit sufficient levels of confidentiality and
security. The problem is that by the time such data exists, the system's concept
and architecture will likely be set in a fully interoperable mode that does not allow
for opening up summary records or other models more sensitive to issues of
autonomy and privacy.
Our patient safety information initiatives must be re-conceptualized as broadly
based on error reduction, quality improvement, reasonable compensation, and an
unreserved respect for patient autonomy and privacy. Without that consensus,
the technical architecture and standards or any HIPAA-style regulatory cram-
down that evolve from the current HIT initiatives will be exposed as built on
nothing more than sand.
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(une 27,2005) (author's contemporaneous notes).
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